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ABSTRACT

This collection of essays seeks to offer a composite portrait of state humanities programs from a wide range of viewpoints. Topics explored include: the role of the National Endowment for the Humanities; the importance of the humanities; origins and new directions for state programs; humanities and the issues of public policy, the arts, science, and the social sciences; the use of the media in state humanities programs; political ramifications in the areas of funding and accountability; and the difficulties that threaten the continuation of state humanities programs. A listing of state humanities councils is included in the appendix. The various authors stress that the values and wisdom promoted by the humanities make the development of state programs invaluable. (JK)

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The state programs, groups of citizens from academic and public life aided by professional staffs, receive basic grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities. They carry out their purpose by administering grants for projects planned and conducted by citizens of their states.

Through demonstrations of the applications of the humanities to the problems and possibilities of local, regional and national life, the state programs refute the notion that the humanities belong strictly to the college and university curriculum. In 1978 the state programs, the first of which began in 1971, spent over 22 million dollars, matched by cash and in-kind contributions, in support of more than 24,000 projects. Their combined efforts reached more than 23,000,000 people. Through public forums, lectures, debates, films and other forms of media, the state programs have made the purposes and methods of the humanities available to the public in ways as varied as the interests of the disciplines themselves.

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CITIZENS, SCHOLARS AND THE HUMANITIES:

AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE HUMANITIES PROGRAMS

Edited by

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(Shelley Simak, Editorial Assistant)

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AN INTRODUCTION TO AN INTRODUCTION

by

Steven Weiland

We live in a time of lively debate about the uses of the humanities. And our critics can be bold. Scientists like B. F. Skinner are openly contemptuous of the humanities because they have no method of experimental analysis and hence no technology of human behavior. "What," he asks in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, "do we have to show for non-scientific or pre-scientific good judgment, or common sense, or the insights gained through personal experience? It is science or nothing." The humanities, it is often said, cannot be readily defined anyway.* We resist - and persist in defining/describing/debating. Humanists recognize the dangers of strict definition and also the truth of Emerson's remark that "the reason for my great admiration for the farmer is that he is a realist and not a dictionary." And humanists and the public recognize that the humanities lack the precision in describing themselves that characterizes other American activities and institutions.

STEVEN WEILAND is Executive Director of the Federation of Public Programs in the Humanities.

* As defined by the legislation governing NEH and its affiliate organizations . . . ". . . the humanities include but are not limited to: history, philosophy, languages, literature, ethics, linguistics, archeology, jurisprudence, comparative religion, criticism, theory and history of the arts, and those aspects of the social sciences employing historical or philosophical approaches. This last group includes cultural anthropology, sociology, political theory, international relations and other subjects concerned with value questions and not with quantitative matters."

Certainly the variety of interests identified as the humanities makes a permanent definition difficult indeed; sometimes the clearest view comes from outside the field. Albert Einstein once said that "Man tries to make for himself, in the fashion that suits him best, a simplified and intelligible picture of the world. He then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and thus to overcome it... He makes this cosmos and its construction the pivot of his emotional life in order to find in this way the piece and serenity which he cannot find in the narrow whirlpool of personal experience.... The supreme task... is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them." The humanities also rely, we can say, on "the sympathetic understanding of experience," not that of the physical or biological world but that of human experience. They are indeed, as college catalogues and the Congress designate them, a set of academic disciplines--literature, history, philosophy and others--but those are only the organizational expressions of an essential style of thought, a habit of mind, which seeks to expand our understanding of our own lives by stressing the uses of the past, the critical nature of language and communications, and the necessity of reflection on matters of personal values and public policy.

Perhaps it is important to attempt a definition because the very need itself suggests that the humanities face a period of unusual opportunity. For most of this century, when the humanities were largely hidden in the curriculum of colleges and universities, few people outside of higher education cared what they were or what they could do. They were degree requirements. But there is undeniably a growing sense in our culture that the humanities, recognized as centuries old styles of thought, analysis and creativity, with a unique focus on questions of value and purpose, are also timely. Questions of public purpose and policy dominate the news and affect our private lives. And our private lives always demand attention to values, held individually and in common.

The state programs are at a decisive moment in their brief history, which is ably recounted in part four of this volume. There is now established an attentive and expectant audience for public humanities programs. There is also an increasing demand for resources by scholars and teachers in the humanities now interested in public activities. There is a new sense of purpose at the National Endowment for the Humanities, and perhaps most important, there are new opportunities to adapt the content and structure of state supported projects to local needs and interests. That is partly

so because of a few simple changes in the 1976 legislation authorizing the Endowment and state programs. Initially bound by project requirements meant to lend unity to the state programs nationally, each state is now able to discover its own sense of purpose, to make its own best judgment about the character and structure of the projects it supports.

TRADITION AND TRANSITION

The state program was designed originally to satisfy a dual impulse in American life. These two interests, which might be described by some as contrary, are suggested by consecutive entries made by Henry David Thoreau in his Journal in September of 1851. "We of Massachusetts boast a good deal of what we do for the education of our people, of our district school system; and yet our district schools are as it were but infant schools, and we have no system for the education of the great mass who are grown up. We spend sixteen thousand dollars on a town house, a hall for our political meetings mainly, and nothing to educate ourselves who are grown up . . . we spend absolutely nothing as a town on our own education, cultivation, civilization." From the point of view of his own scholarship Thoreau saw the need for public activities which made the humanities available to a democratic culture perhaps uniquely organized to use them. He may, as we sometimes do, have overestimated public interest, but he was sure of the principle and the need for institutions guaranteeing a better informed public.

Yet whatever the intentions of humanists there are never any guarantees that their intentions and interests are those of the public. Thoreau recognized this also when he wrote in his Journal the next day that "The railroads as much as anything appear to have unsettled the farmers. Our young Concord farmers and their young wives, hearing this bustle about them, seeing the world going by as it were - some daily to the cities about their business, some to California - plainly cannot make up their minds to live the quiet, retired, old fashioned, country-farmers' life. They are impatient if they live more than a mile from the railroad." Thoreau, of course, was an instinctively prescriptive person, but his suggestion that social circumstances demonstrated the need for public activities designed to enrich the life of non-professional humanists as they did that of scholars themselves was precisely the idea behind state humanities programs. Despite the confidence of humanists like Thoreau, the need, as it is consistently identified, for a public role for the humanities has always been a matter of some dispute and alas, indifference, in the public. The state programs are only the latest in a series of American attempts in public education, efforts to take the anxiety out of living more than a mile from the railroad.

There are substantial traditions for public programs in the humanities: The Chautauqua, Lyceum and Settlement House movements which flourished in this country throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. Chautauqua, for instance, the institution in western New York state, and in great measure the traveling tent shows which carried the Chautauqua name throughout the United States and abroad, sought to include serious lecture, debate and informed discussion of public issues as part of their programs. They used humanists as lecturers and debaters, though of course they prized oratory more than genuine scholarship. These efforts at "culture under canvas," as they were called, were enormously successful, especially before World War I and the growth of film, radio, television and higher education. And clearly their premises and problems were in many ways similar to those of the state humanities programs.

In a sketch of fictional "Katytown," Zane Grey has a group of characters discussing the merits of the local Chautauqua and as one believer points out, its great virtue is that "it makes you feel as if Katytown isn't all there is to it." Behind this observation is a sense of what certain kinds of humanistic enterprises can indeed provide. But like any ambitious and complicated public venture, the Chautauquas had their problems: establishing a suitable level of public exchange and discussion, and maintaining adequate financial backing and the quality of the programs. Financial support, at least between 1890 and 1910, couldn't keep pace with public interest. And the quality of the educational program declined as they spread across the country and the supply of well prepared speakers thinned out. Humanists and scientists who did participate were then often ridiculed by their peers for going public and sharing the tent with bell ringers, trained dogs and Tyrolean yodelers. Entertainment, always a feature of the Chautauquas in the sense that the programs were meant to avoid the formality of nineteenth century classroom instruction, had overtaken education. The Chautauquas left behind the example of an important experiment in the enrichment of public life. They by no means solved the problem of building a permanent relation between the humanities and an interested public but they proved that such a relation was possible.

In the early 1970's that relation was reaffirmed or re-established in the new humanities programs begun in the states by the National Endowment for the Humanities. The state programs were organized, fortunately, in a way that implicitly rejected the patronizing attitude of The Commission of the Humanities (1964) which considered "America's Need of the Humanities" and urged that citizens avoid "trivial and narcotic amusements" and turn instead to the humanities to fill the "abyss of leisure." In the earliest experimental years (the experiment is still a young one) projects were required to adhere to public policy issues as expressed in a state theme, to address only out of school adults, and to include the humanities

defined simply and perhaps wisely as a list of the disciplines. The programs were not always imaginative in content and format or attractive alternatives to the many other activities with which people, however in need of the humanities, could occupy themselves. Though undoubtedly the success of the program nationally was in part due to its near uniform structure and purpose, some would argue the opposite - that the program succeeded despite the requirements.

The transition to state programs fitted to state needs, as a result of the 1976 Congressional mandate, is nearing completion. In the fifty states, Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C. there are now programs as similar as the traditions of the humanistic disciplines require and as diverse as the people and places which host them.

THE ARTS OF THE ORDINARY

Wherever they are now practiced, however, the "public humanities" still need and profit from explanation.

William May has noted in his recently published "The Humanities and the Civic Self" that in pursuing understanding, interpretation and criticism, the humanities contribute to the social order.* "The society at large," he claims, "has a vested interest in the clarification of its own culture." May's position, however, is more than simply a restatement of powerful but familiar arguments for attention to the interests and methods of the humanities. He suggests the inadequacy of the claim that the humanities have a kind of adhesive value, that they help to bind society together. Instead he claims that we can concede the value of tradition to society while we pursue its benefits through contest and disputation. May is not, I would add, recommending a form of assertiveness training for academic humanists but a conception of the disciplines and their products - in teaching, research and other kinds of public service - based on their open dialectical value. The passionate reasoning typical of the humanities requires, in May's words, "taking positions and discovering that rejected alternatives do not go away. They pop up in the arguments of one's spouse, in the criticisms of colleagues, and in the views of the political party not one's own." This is simply to recognize the inevitably public result of serious private attention to the humanities. Properly valued and presented they are as common as the pleasures and uncertainties of everyday life and as complex as the problems and possibilities of a democratic society.

Our continuing task therefore is to explain the relation of the humanities to everyday life, their role in the "ordinary" lives of people including ourselves. I use that word quite deliberately because one satisfying format for such an explanation is that provided a few years ago by British social historian Raymond Williams. He asserted quite directly that culture itself is ordinary.

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* "The Humanities and the Civic Self" is available from the Poynter Center, Indiana University, 410 North Park Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47405.

"Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment, under the pressure of experience, contact, and discovery, writing themselves into the land."

Culture is ordinary, Williams claims, because every society is made and remade in every individual mind. But culture has also, of course, a second and potentially social or public aspect. Williams explains the relation between the two this way: "The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of shapes, purposes, and meanings, so that work, observation and communication are possible. Then, second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, the making of new observations, comparisons, and meanings. Hence a culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; and the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested. These are the ordinary process of human societies and human minds, and we see through them the nature of a culture: that it is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the most ordinary common meanings and the finest individual and social meanings."

I have gone a step beyond Williams by proposing that between those common or traditional meanings and the individual or creative ones there is a role for the humanities and especially for public programs addressed to those who are not in the classroom. The humanities in this sense can be everyday instruments of insights and discrimination. There is no quick or easy way this can be accomplished, but public programs have made an experimental start in their first nine years.

Some may say that the humanities are already an important part of everyday life, that they only need to be acknowledged as active in a forum outside the familiar academic ones. Psychiatrist Robert Coles has often commented on our instinct to under-estimate public interest in anything but supermarket sales and network news. He has frequently illustrated what he calls "the stuff of the humanities" in the words of the poor, of blue collar and migrant workers and others whose lives, many would assume, are unrelated to the methods and interests of the humanities. Here is a moving quotation from an American factory worker cited by Coles in remarks at the installation of Joseph Duffey as Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

> Sometimes, I think there's nothing to believe in, except the almighty dollar--and a little influence, that always helps. Sometimes, I see people behaving real rotten to other people, and I remember the wars in my lifetime, and I think of the troubles all over the world, and I think back to my father and how he couldn't find a job when we were kids, and my mother being upset for him,

> and for us, and I remind myself of what a lousy life it still is for most of the people on this earth--well, I can get real low. But for all the trouble my family has had, and the world has had, I guess I'm lucky, because I don't stay down there in the dumps too long. I stop and say to myself that life may be a big mystery, like they tell you in church, but there's your family to hold on to, and the future your kids will have.
>
> My wife and I have always tried to teach our children to be good and kind. I don't believe in church on Sunday and let the Devil run the show the rest of the week. I don't believe in talking to your children about God and then teaching them to be cutthroat artists. I tell my children to stop themselves every few days and look up at the sky and listen to their conscience and remember what they should believe in: Give out as good as you want to get.
>
> That was my father's philosophy of life. He didn't have a lot of material things to give, but he had himself--a big person he was; and he was always there to make us think twice before we stayed mean too long, and he was always there to make us realize the world doesn't circle around us. My wife says it's a real stroke of luck to be alive and living in this country and not a lot of other places; and I'll tell you, people ought to stop and say yes, that's right, and yes, I'm here, and I'm going to give of myself, the best I know how--and maybe tomorrow I'll find a way of being a better person. You try to think about this life and what you owe it, and you try to get your kids to think about this life, too, and what they owe it.

For Coles, this man indeed understands the humanities and hence makes a daily contribution to their public practise. He insists that "the humanities do not belong to one kind of person; they are part of the lives of ordinary people who have their own ways of struggling for coherence, for a compelling faith, for social vision, for an ethical position, for a sense of historical perspective." We must continue to find ways to address that interest. In this sense, public humanities programs are not a choice for academics and civic leaders but an obligation to serve the public on terms which it deserves: sustained attention to their inner lives, to the way attitudes and values are shaped and held, and to the relation between private life and the public good.

DIVISION AND DIRECTION

The opportunity was outlined recently by one of Cole's psychoanalytic colleagues. In addressing the American Academy for the Advancement

of Science on the status of psychoanalysis as a profession, Erik Erikson stressed its adaptive qualities and inevitable ethical interests. Remembering his audience, he quoted a provocatively simple definition of the difference between science and ethics: that science is descriptive and demands verification and that ethics is prescriptive and calls for justification. Psychoanalysis, he suggested, stands somewhere in between. So also do the humanities, which as a profession also share with psychoanalysis a division of interests, between the inner workings and imperatives of the disciplines themselves and the social functions they might assume. Erikson says of his profession that "we had better find the proper frameworks for teaching the tenets of psychoanalysis both in the context of clinical training and in that of humanist enlightenment. To search in each framework for a style which enlarges and trains ethical consciousness even as it reveals the workings of the unconscious." The challenge to all public humanities programs is to adapt the style and rigor of humanistic thought to the new opportunities for application and display. This opportunity, of course, is shared by our educational, cultural, even political institutions. Hannah Arendt perhaps put this best when she said that "no activity can become excellent if the world does not provide a proper space for its exercise. Neither education nor ingenuity nor talent can replace the constituent elements of the public realm which can make it the proper place for human excellence."

Certainly Thoreau overstated the case when he wrote, again in his Journal, but now a few months before his death that "we hear a good deal said about moonshine by so called practical people, and the next day, perchance, we hear of their failure, they have been dealing in fancy stocks; but there really never is any moonshine of this kind in the practise of poets and philosophers; there never are any hard times or failures with them, for they deal with permanent values." Thoreau's optimism would have made him a first rate project director. Humanities programs will certainly contain some portion of moonshine, but that is perhaps inevitable and we can hope a small price to pay for a public activity directed by tradition but today unique in its combined attention to intellectual interests and the character of public life.

The essays which follow seek to offer a composit portrait of the state programs that is as full as space allows. The emphasis is on the variety of positions from which they can be understood and appreciated. Nineteen eighty is the tenth anniversary year of the councils and therefore a good time to begin to clarify their origins, contributions and problems. In this first edition of Citizens, Scholars and the Humanities we hope to assist in that effort. Future editions will no doubt reflect the discussion and scholarship of this year. We welcome your suggestions.

PART I GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE HUMANITIES

Toward Cultural Citizenship: The Role of the National Endowment for the Humanities — Joseph Duffey — 11

"We need to promote cultural citizenship as the best avenue to an enriched political citizenship," Joseph Duffey says in this essay. "This is what Congress had in mind when, in the Endowment enabling legislation, it argued that 'democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens.'" To further this ideal, he outlines the four goals of the Endowment.

Why the Humanities? — Charles Frankel — 21

"The modern world, almost by definition, is a world in which new knowledge and techniques produce rapidly changing social conditions which in turn produce vertiginous changes in human beliefs and values," Charles Frankel says. ". . .Surely the efforts to find coherence, to restore a sense of continuity and direction cannot be left only to visionaries or sloganeers, or . . . to newspaper men or leaders of political parties." For these and other reasons Frankel justifies government support of the humanities.

TOWARD CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

by

Joseph Duffey

At a hearing in Boston's Faneuil Hall, called to hear opinions on the proposed White House Conferences on the Humanities and the Arts, several speakers referred to the importance the humanities had for the Founding Fathers of our nation.* Indeed, the men who debated the wisdom of independence and the nature of our Federal government at Faneuil Hill, at Independence Hall or in the Virginia House of Burgesses, seem in retrospect to have understood every issue better by reference to classical learning. The Roman historians shaped the way Adams and Jefferson perceived the dangers of British tyranny; Aristotle and Cicero and Polybius were ever the most treasured "consultants," as we would say today, for Hamilton and Madison in framing their arguments for the Federal Constitution.

Nor would that generation of political leaders have been confused about what to call the humanities. At a time when there were fewer than a thousand college students in the young nation, all studying the same curriculum in Cambridge, New Haven or Williamsburg, the humanities meant Greek and Latin, rhetoric, logic, theology, moral and natural philosophy.

Another speaker at that recent hearing in Boston was Ann D. Hill, Director of the St. Martin dePorres Senior Center in Providence, Rhode Island. Ms. Hill would not have been invited to a Congressional hearing two centuries ago — she is black and female. But as much as for the eighteenth-century statesmen, the humanities are important today for Ms. Hill's group of older citizens, a "lifeline," as she called it in her testimony. Through a recent program organized by the National Council on the Aging and funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, Ms. Hill and others in the center meet regularly to discuss family and local history, images of the aging in literature, and ways of interpreting the experience of aging in American society. They researched and wrote a play about the history of black women in Rhode Island and produced it for other senior centers. They created an oral history archive of their own recollections and are making those materials available to school children in the Providence area. They have begun to travel to historic sites together and to share their readings. They are coming, even at the age of eighty, Ms. Hill remarked, to "understand the dimensions of their own lives from what happened in the past." This is only one example of the many ways Americans are engaging in learning in the humanities.

JOSEPH DUFFEY is Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. He has served as General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors and Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs.

* This hearing was held on January 30, 1978. Despite testimony supporting them, the proposed White House Conferences were not funded by the Congress.

There are thirteen million students in degree programs in the United States today, and another twenty million who attend extension and continuing education classes. The number of those who participate in learning in the humanities through museums, libraries, public radio and television, and through the simple acts of an evening's reading and conversation, greatly exceed those in formal education.

It is only recently that we have come to appreciate how vast the cultural resources of America are, how diverse are the serious questions Americans ask themselves, and how rich and complex and lively is the intellectual life of our society. It is hard to generalize about the activity of so many Americans, and easy to argue what is or is not properly a part of the humanities and what is or is not deserving of government encouragement or support. But since I have become Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, I have witnessed the extraordinary vitality of curiosity in our society.

I have seen a hunger for values and meaning among Americans in all walks and stations of life. Because of recent events in our nation, many want to ask questions of ethical choice related to issues of everyday business or professional practice and to the way politics is conducted. For the first time in American history the commitment to an unlimited technological expansion is being fundamentally questioned. Among some workers, the opportunity to have the time for education and personal improvement is reportedly as valued as wage increases. While we are undergoing an unsettling period in which personal and career goals and family and community relationships are being transformed, these changes are occurring with unaccustomed reflectiveness and debate; we are interested in what is happening to us, and whether it is right or wrong. I see a hunger among American parents and students for an education that attends to questions of values, and an eagerness among scholars to uncover the moral and political biases of their research. And this attention to larger philosophical questions is the fundamental activity of scholars and teachers in the humanities.

We are witnessing a growing enthusiasm among Americans to discover their own history. Only recently have we begun to understand that this is no longer a young and naive nation, that our ways of life are deeply rooted in the American past. Now, alongside the scholars in our great research libraries one can find thousands of citizens, black and white, Mayflower descendant and child of steerage passenger alike, tracing their family's history and genealogy through the contours of our common historical experience. Thousands of preservationists, social studies teachers and photographers are jostling the city planners, title searchers and downtown developers for a better look at our historic environments and old maps. The memories of grandmothers and the anecdotes of uncles are being tape-recorded in thousands of homes, and albums of family pictures are being annotated with details fast disappearing from living memory. This historical perspective on our own lives is central to what we call the "humanities."

I have seen the passion among American scholars for critical analysis, for interpreting the great texts of our tradition through new approaches to the study of language. I have witnessed the passion among teachers and students alike for reviving, in the study of philosophy, the most fundamental questions about justice and liberty: for reexamining how scientific

hypotheses are framed and tested, and how one artist may converse with another's work across the centuries: for attempting to compare the rules by which alien and premodern cultures organize their daily lives with those which govern the way we act today. All these exercises of scholarship appear to me to manifest a new interest in theory, in expressing a sense of our common humanity. And that sense of commonality is always a goal of the humanities.

These expressions of curiosity, these encounters with complexity and meaning, comprise the province of the humanities in American life. Frankly, it makes my job a good deal clearer to define the humanities in this way, for it is curiosity which links the most sophisticated inquiries of our senior scholars to the insights of school children visiting an archaeological exhibit for the first time, and to the reflections of an ordinary citizen about the meaning of his or her work and life history.

As a mode of thinking, curiosity in the humanities has to be distinguished from other ways of exercising our minds. To me, the key distinction is the way such curiosity resists closure. Unlike technical problem-solving, which occupies much of our time in a busy and increasingly bureaucratized society, thinking about the questions of the humanities is not a way of reaching answers quickly. In fact, it might be said that learning in the field of the humanities is not chiefly concerned with answers to questions as much as sharpening the way we ask questions in the first place.

Daring to raise questions about meaning and responsibility, when all the pressures of daily events would seem to tempt us toward settling on simple solutions, is the courage I find so praiseworthy in those Americans whose lives are engaged by the humanities. But this is not a foolhardy courage, for venturing inquiry in the humanities is also inevitably a form of humility. We can never know the answer to many of our questions. How, for example, can we achieve both independence and community? To what extent is the reliance on technology a way toward freedom or its own form of bondage? How much of a child's character is determined by his or her genes, and how much by experience? There are many different voices among the traditions of the humanities, but all of them seem to cherish this human willingness to ask humbly the most urgent questions. Curiosity in the humanities is a free person's humility and a humble person's freedom.

When we think of the humanities as a mode of inquiry, a dimension of learning, we may also understand them as ways of relating a person to his or her world. In our other guises the human animal is a maker, a user, a part of the biological and physical processes of the world. In the sphere of the humanities, we are inquirers, thinkers, and observers, creatures with potential and spirit.

In a way, the original enabling legislation which created the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1965 was based upon the same distinction. Congress expressed the hope then that America's leadership in the world would not rest solely upon our power, wealth and technology, upon our skills, that is, as makers and users. Rather we needed to take pride in "the nation's high qualities as a leader in the realm of ideas and of the spirit."

To accomplish this, Congress mandated that the Endowment should suport inquiry in the disciplines of the humanities by as many of our people as possible, and that such inquiry should be related to the examination of the crucial contemporary issues facing Americans.

The task of the Humanities Endowment, then, from its very start was one of connection and interaction. It was not to be a ministry of culture, charged with creating and sustaining all of our cultural institutions, and dictating how each would serve the interests of the state and its citizens. Nor could the NEH be a kind of War Production Board for culture, a giant arsenal turning out cultural products for consumption by the American public. Its task, instead, was to encourage and nurture curiosity. To do that it has had, first and foremost, to encourage and nurture the interaction between our people and their questions, on the one hand, and our cultural institutions and their potential, on the other.

The agency has grown from $2.5 million to $121 million in a dozen years. It is incumbent upon the Endowment today clearly to frame its goals and objectives. My first obligation has been to work with the Endowment staff and with others in developing such goals -- goals which link the activities of the Endowment to the communities it serves and which will allow us to be more accountable for our programs.

The four goals we have developed are:

Goal I: To promote public understanding and use of the humanities, and to relate the humanities to current conditions of national life.

Goal II: To improve the quality of humanities programs in educational institutions, and to encourage and assist nontraditional ventures in humanistic learning.

Goal III: To enrich and broaden the intellectual foundation for humanistic endeavors, and to support scholarly additions to humanistic knowledge.

Goal IV: To sustain and enhance essential facilities and resources which undergird humanistic pursuits, and to help shape and inform the future role and well-being of humanistic concerns.

I. The first goal, To promote public understanding and use of the humanities, and to relate the humanities to current conditions of national life, recognizes the myriad ways our citizens learn.

From the earliest days of European settlements in North America, most learning in the humanities has occurred outside schools and colleges. At first, the church played a singular role in transmitting liberal learning as well as religion. The itinerant ministers of the South and West, the local pastors

in each New England town, the mission priests in the Southwest, were agents of culture as well as of conversion. The nineteenth century was preeminently the age of the voluntary society, and thousands of Americans were introduced to the difficult questions of politics and philosophy in local lyceum meetings, in reading circles and debating clubs, in fraternal lodges and political party meetings, in workingmen's associations and benevolent societies. Great museum collections and public libraries were established in every area of the nation. By the middle of the last century, a national culture had begun to take hold -- with monthly magazines, lecture circuits of celebrated authors, and huge gatherings at places like Chautauqua. As the years passed, the daily newspaper, the wire services, and eventually radio and television have made possible the simultaneous participation of millions of Americans in nonformal educational experiences. This growth has raised for some the spectre of homogenized mediocrity at the heart of our cultural life.

The National Endowment for the Humanities takes as its charge the need to resist cultural conformity. To us that means supporting programs for minority audiences which might never satisfy the economy considerations of the national media market. When we do support public television programs, we want them to be especially venturesome, intellectually engaging and artistically creative. Further, we are committed to making stronger links between such programs as The Adams Chronicles, or The American Short Story, and discussion groups and publications which can bring related learning in the humanities closer to home.

Relating the humanities to the American people is more than merely a process of disseminating a national culture. Imposing conformity in the name of spreading "excellence" from the top down is not preferable to the method employed by advertisers in seeking the lowest common denominator.

We must acknowledge the diverse cultural life that grows out of the protean conditions of American social life. This is what public programs of the Endowment, and most especially the state programs in the humanities, seek to do. By making the encouragement of curiosity in the humanities a part of the work of local civic, ethnic and cultural organizations, we help diversify the meaning of the humanities in American life. When we support organizations which are close to the workplaces of Americans -- labor unions, farmers' groups, business and professional associations -- we encourage the use of such forums for debate on political and philosophical issues, relating the humanities to the most concrete matters of public life.

Some may complain that the essence of the humanities is being fragmented or "watered down" by such an approach. I disagree. The humanities are not degraded by juxtaposing them with the problems of modern life. Scholars and teachers in the humanities can help clarify such issues as land-use planning, the allocation of energy resources, affirmative action, and violence in American life. Though such intellectual activity should never replace the private reflection and study of scholars, the exercise of their public responsibilities in encouraging the thoughtfulness of all Americans is crucial in nurturing a broadly participatory culture.

II. The second goal of the National Endowment for the Humanities is, To improve the quality of humanities programs in educational institutions, and to encourage and assist non-traditional ventures in humanistic learning.

The place of the humanities in our educational system is in some danger. Enrollments in humanities courses are declining; the number of students majoring in the humanities is only six percent of the overall student population. Graduate work in the disciplines of the humanities is being cut back in response to the declining job market for recent Ph.D.'s.

But in a sense this situation is not altogether inauspicious for humanities education at the elementary, secondary and undergraduate levels. We are witnessing, I believe, the end of a period in which the humanities have been dominated by the research-oriented graduate schools. Our course designs and our teaching strategies have for some time been more suitable for the training of apprentice scholars than for educating laymen for lifelong love of the humanities.

The Humanities Endowment is helping educational institutions accommodate to these challenges. Much energy is now being invested in the creation of core curricula. Exciting work is being done in bringing humanities courses into the world of professional training. More than half the medical schools in the country, for example, now require courses in which every student is expected to address the ethical and social dimensions of health care while being trained as a physician.

Stronger links are also being forged between instruction in the humanities and the study of contemporary issues. In an era when many sources of educational funding have turned away from an interest in foreign cultures and languages, the NEH has become one of the strongest supporters of area studies. Particularly good work is also being done, at both college and precollege levels, in citizenship education, focused especially on an understanding of the American legal system.

But the most fundamental challenge we face is in the area of providing our students with the basic intellectual competence they need to act as fully enfranchised members of a democratic society. The technical ability to read and write is absolutely essential, but we must never settle for that alone. What people read and how they write is the measure of their ability to construct meaningful lives in this increasingly complex world. As much as a "back to basics" movement, then, we need an emphasis on "back to complexity." We need to provide students with skills in reasoning, in judging among difficult alternatives, in understanding ideas from many different perspectives. This is the special role which scholars and teachers in the humanities can bring to the intellectual preparation of our young people.

III. The third goal of the Humanities Endowment is, To enrich and broaden the intellectual foundation for humanistic endeavors, and to support scholarly additions to humanistic knowledge.

Scholarly research is sometimes viewed as the passing back and forth of esoteric bits of knowledge by self-styled experts, with little connection to the life of the society around them. It is more accurate to describe the curiosity of scholars in the humanities as an inquisitiveness shared by all Americans.

The research work of American scholars is as rich and varied and complex a tapestry as the nation itself. From the threads of that work, at least as it is revealed in the grants we make, one can discern some significant new aspects of American culture as we enter the last quarter of this century.

Scholars are working hard to recapture the experiences of long-neglected groups of ordinary Americans. Archives of letters and personal papers of immigrant groups are being established. With the aid of computers, demographic and archaeological evidence about seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers is telling us much about the degree to which America was an innovative or a derivative culture in its earliest years.

Business and political historians who once chronicled the lives of captains of industry and political party leaders are now turning their attention to the experience of ordinary workers and the activities of ethnic communities. Students of art history who once concentrated on high-style painting and sculpture have been turning their attention to regional folk arts and crafts.

This kind of intellectual labor has addressed itself to the diverse cultural backgrounds of the American people. But we also share a common culture as Americans. All of us are heirs, in a way, of two writers -- Mark Twain and William James -- whose works are being edited with the support of the Humanities Endowment. Twain and James were almost exact contemporaries, both dying in 1910. Twain was a rowdy Missouri yarnspinner, whose tales poked fun at both small-town vices and metropolitan corruptions. James was a gentle Yankee, savoring both sides of every philosophical paradox in order to leave room for the best instincts of ordinary Americans in what he called the "Gilded Age." More important than who they were is what these two writers mean to us today as we struggle to bring the American past into perspective. We still learn much from the challenge of Huck Finn who risked his life and his eternal soul for the sake of Nigger Jim. We still take heart from William James's dictum that the will to believe can influence the course of events. In helping to publish their work, the NEH is clarifying the rich and diverse heritage of our literary tradition.

Nor is our culture entirely North American in its resources. We have, in the last quarter century, done much to sustain scholarly research on foreign cultures. As Professor Jacob Neusner of Brown University has said, Americans are proud today to be "second (only) to the French in the study of French history and literature, second (only) to the Indians in the study of Hindu civilization, second (only) to the Japanese in the study of Japanese culture."

Finally, even when a project seems distant from the contemporary eye, events often conspire to make it more timely. A major NEH grant to the

University of California at Irvine is supporting the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, a computerized data bank of all the known texts of the ancient Greek civilizations. Such a research tool will be of international significance for scholars in the humanities. But not only for scholars. All of us who live in the knowledge of twentieth-century totalitarianism can well understand the impulse to return to the Greek philosophers, as the Founding Fathers did, to grasp the essential nature of political life in our civilization. Everyone who draws inspiration from the text of the New Testament, or who is stunned by the lessons of the great Greek playwrights, can see how important the preservation and cultivation of that language is for our own expressions of curiosity and passion.

The humanities are timely when we assess the philosophical arguments being made for and against recombinant DNA research, or when we finally collect the documents which explore the constitutional history of the "war powers" doctrine which has so perplexed Congress in the last thirty years. But they are just as timely when we come to grips with the long continuity of our curiosity as a species. Scholarship in the humanities is clearly an avenue for all of us to find significant meaning.

IV. The fourth goal is, To sustain and enhance essential facilities and resources which undergird humanistic pursuits, and to help shape and inform the future role and well-being of humanistic concerns.

The National Endowment for the Humanities exists to encourage the curiosity of Americans; its interest is in promoting thoughtfulness among our citizens about their history, their values and their sense of the human condition.

But the Humanities Endowment cannot accomplish this directly. It relies upon the agency of hundreds of academic and cultural institutions, media groups and community organizations, and of the people who work in them.

The financial plight of many of these organizations in the 1970's is serious. Fixed income from endowments cannot keep pace with the increasing costs of basic services and inflation. Seventy-eight liberal arts colleges have closed their doors over the past decade. Three out of five museums in the United States have had to reduce their services to the public because of these heavier burdens.

The Humanities Endowment has realized for a long time that the dangers faced by these institutions threatened the liveliness of American curiosity. Still, we are not charged by Congress to be an endowment for colleges, or for research libraries, or for museums, but rather for the humanities. Congress has, in any case, wisely provided for other government agencies to provide support for operating expenses.

The role of the NEH is different. Through the Challenge Grant program, the Endowment tries to encourage the rich treasure troves of our culture to give long, hard and serious thought to their own institutional strengths and weaknesses. We want them to consider which cultural needs they can best address with their own resources, and which are not absolutely

essential to their organization's reason for being. We want them to consider where their present audience lies and what other groups in the community and in the nation might be interested in their work. Most of all, we want cultural institutions to find their way to sources of income stable enough for them to plot their course wisely through the next decades.

The sustenance of the resources which undergird inquiry in the humanities may take many forms. Sometimes it is an emergency effort to save an important research library or special collection from being lost. And yet, when no local support is adequate to their continued survival, the Humanities Endowment expresses the nation's commitment to preserve these materials for a future of use.

On the other hand, there are times when the need is not so much for immediate action as for careful foresight and planning. As the National Endowment for the Humanities has grown, it has become itself a place of inquiry about the future of our cultural institutions. Support is now being given to studies of the economic problems of scholarly publications, of research libraries, and of other aspects of scholarship. Special attention must also be given to the problems of unemployment among Ph.D.'s in the humanities.

To what end is all this energetic encouragement of the curiosity of Americans? How is our society improved, or our individual lives enhanced, by the work of the National Endowment for the Humanities?

I began by citing the examples of the Founding Fathers and noting how deeply their deliberations were colored by a study of the humanities. But most of the men and women whose fighting secured the independence proclaimed at Philadelphia did not know Latin or Greek, had never read the philosophers or debated the resemblance of British tyranny to the excesses of the Roman emperors.

As historians in our own day are discovering, these colonists who resisted the British troops had other ideas in mind, visions of an America which partook, even if they didn't know it, of other aspects of the Western tradition. Some thought of the English king as an Antichrist and saw in the union of arms the first step toward a religious union of souls. Some wanted merely to be left alone to farm and hunt, to dream of their own Arcadias without the interference of royal governors.

They also were part of the American culture, though they didn't seem very "cultured" to the British travelers who wrote about them. They, too, had questions to ask, visions to imagine, wisdom to share.

It is in the spirit of both sorts of revolutionaries, of those who were so splendidly articulate as to have given us brilliant commentaries on government like the Federalist Papers, and those who articulated their visions in ways that left no written traces, that we seek to sustain the humanities.

They were both necessary to build a nation. And two centuries later, both sorts of men and women -- carefully schooled thinkers and lay persons alike --

are necessary to build a culture.

We need a culture every bit as diverse and complex as our nation. In which all the important questions we face as a nation can be understood as parts of a continuing tradition of inquiry. In which we -- all of us -- are aware of the values implicit in the choices we make.

The alternative, I am convinced, is for us to view every question as the province of a group of technical experts, too difficult for the rest of us to understand. And once that occurs, debate and decision are no longer in the hands of the American people.

We need to promote cultural citizenship, then, as the best avenue to an enriched political citizenship. This is what Congress had in mind when, in the Endowment's enabling legislation, it argued that "democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens."

The sort of cultural citizenship I envision goes well beyond offering our people a merely physical access to our cultural and educational institutions and to the traditions they interpret. Americans need and should have the richer opportunity of <u>intellectual</u> access to these cultural resources.

At the beginning of the Republic, Benjamin Franklin remarked that "we live in an age of experiments." The word "experiments" then meant something a bit different from what it means today. Then it was synonymous with "experience," and both words implied an open-ended intellectual encounter with the facts of the world. Gradually, over the past two centuries, the two words have diverged. "Experience" has grown broader and less precise, coming to mean any personal event. "Experiment," on the other hand, has become more formal, now limited almost entirely to the sort of investigations which scientists perform.

I want Americans once again to live in an age of experiment in Franklin's sense, to be curious about all aspects of their lives. Not merely when they are in school, or when they are professionally engaged in scholarship, but all the time.

I want Americans once again to live in an age of experiment in the older sense, to be curious, to tolerate ambiguity in themselves and to appreciate complexity in one another.

WHY THE HUMANITIES?

by

Charles Frankel

We have met to discuss a subject of great practical and professional interest to almost all of us who are here -- the proper role of government in relation to the humanities and the proper requirements which humanistic endeavors should meet if they are to be supported by government.

What is at stake in these discussions is the quality of the environment in which Americans live, that environment in its most important aspect -- not its physical aspect, though that too is involved -- but its imaginative, its moral, its aesthetic, its intellectual aspect.

What will our country offer its members as a diet for their minds and souls? They are the citizens of a free society. They must make their own decisions about the good, the true and the beautiful, as about the genuine article and the fake, the useful and the useless, the profitable and the unprofitable. But their individual minds, their individual schemes of value and structures of belief, are largely formed by the social and cultural atmosphere, with all its educational and miseducational effects. And they can only choose from among the alternatives that our institutions, public and private, make available to them, and they must do this choosing within a pricing system that inevitably affects their choices, and that is influenced not only by market forces but by public policy and the movement of public revenues.

No institution within our society, certainly not government, has the capacity to control this cultural and moral environment. We can be thankful this is so. Nevertheless, any citizen -- and certainly anyone with public responsibilities or anyone who is a trustee for a tradition of civilized achievement -- must ask what part he or she can play in shaping the environment in which we Americans must live and find our being.

The late CHARLES FRANKEL was founder and president of the National Humanities Center in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, and Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He served in the State Department and was a frequent analyst of the relation between the humanities and public policy. Mr. Frankel presented this paper at a symposium on "Government and the Humanities," sponsored by the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library of the University of Texas at Austin in 1978.

What images of human possibility will American society put before its members? What standards will it suggest to them as befitting the dignity of the human spirit? What decent balance among human employments will it exhibit? Will it speak to Americans only of success and celebrity and the quick fix that makes you happy, or will it find a place for grace, elegance, nobility and a sense of connection with the whole human adventure? What cues will be given to our citizens, those who are living and those still to be born, that will indicate to them what authoritative institutions of our nation, our schools and halls of learning, regard as of transcendent importance? These are the questions that are really at issue, it seems to me, when we consider the place of the humanities on the national scene and the role that government should play in their care and feeding. And they are important enough, I think, to suggest why it may be worthwhile to continue to live and struggle with the paradox and challenge of government programs in support of the humanities.

For it should not be possible any longer to deceive ourselves. The troubles that have been experienced in making these programs work are inherent in them. They are not caused by foolish administrative errors or philistine pressures or disagreements that grow out of clashes between personalities or political parties. Such things aggravate tensions that are already unavoidably present, and that are as intrinsic to the game, as much a part of its fun as tackling is to football.

The paradox and challenge of government programs in support of the humanities reside in the attempt, on the government side, to spend public money in an accountable manner without managing or directing or intruding on free intellectual enterprises. The paradox and challenge lie in the hope, on the humanistic community's side, that it can receive government assistance in solving its problems and that it can still persist in the established habits and attitudes of probably the most highly individualistic of all the departments of intellectual activity.

A government doing business with humanists? Humanists meeting in committee with Congressmen or budget-makers or Presidential appointees? This is to set before ourselves the task of maintaining a *modus vivendi* between politicians and poets, accountants and admirers of Kandinsky, bureaucrats and followers of Thoreau. It is as though we were to take two radical examples of the American character -- the capacity to plan and pull together and to be members of a team, and the disposition to lawlessness and to anarchic individualism -- and to demand that they make peace and learn to profit each from the other.

Still, it can be done. The record supports that judgment, in my opinion. And if it can be done, the achievement is so considerable that we have some reason to look to the future with confidence and

to think that the effort is worth continuing. Yet, given what we know are the troubles, the abrasions, the misunderstandings, that inevitably surround this effort, it is also natural to ask, why bother? And there are other reasons to ask that question as well -- the growing conviction that government has been seeking to do too much, the apparently declining confidence, felt by humanists themselves, in liberal education, and, not least, the disillusionments of two decades with professors and their doings, whether they give their advice to presidents in the Oval Office or from picket lines across the street. In the present national mood it is not only inevitable but it is necessary and imperative to ask, Why seek to maintain so odd a relationship as one between government and the humanities? Why should government give specific support to the humanities? And why should the humanities claim such support, and do they accept any reciprocal responsibilities when they do?

II

Although I would like to try, I shall not seek to offer here a general definition of that elusive phrase "the humanities." But I should like to focus on some curious features of the humanities, noticed by most people who look at them closely. I believe this may help us to see what some of the functions of the humanities are.

Let me begin with the mixture of involvement and detachment that characterizes the humanities. The humanistic disciplines might be described maliciously as parasitical disciplines. They are, that is to say, second-order disciplines; they feed on other people's work. They would not exist if human beings did not, quite independently of these disciplines, engage in certain distinctive kinds of activity. They worship, they talk, dance, sing, paint, praise the beauties of their beloved; they tell stories, maintain legends, build monuments, try to discover facts, live by rules, make choices between better and worse, complain about injustice; they puzzle over the mysterious ways of God and man. And to all these activities human beings bring passion. They engage in them from motives of fear or awe or love or practical advantage, and sometimes out of sheer physical excitement or emotional exaltation. They do not engage in them coldly or because it has been proved to them, by some abstract intellectual formula, that they should do so. They are learned activities, yet it is as though they were done by instinct.

Yet in all these activities there is a tendency in sophisticated civilizations towards a certain turning inwards, a certain process of feeding on what has gone before. The arts, like religion, law, war or politics, develop a professional tradition. In the arts, for example, the playwright, painter, novelist, employ old myths and symbols; and when he uses them he presents his own ideas and

images on one level, and on another, he offers an implicit commentary on what his predecessors have done with those same myths and symbols. He addresses a living audience, but also he is speaking to people whose minds and eyes and tropisms and aversions have in part been shaped by a company of men and women with whom he feels bound across the ages, people who have worked the same territory and used the same pathmarks for their purposes. And in speaking to his living audience he is counting on their having minds and eyes and tropisms and aversions that have in part been shaped by the very myths, images and symbols he is now reshaping.

The artist's or writer's spontaneity and originality are thus products of a dialectical process in which he plays with and against a received heritage. The sharpness and depth of the effects that Sophocles achieved in retelling the story of Oedipus, that Renaissance painters achieved in painting Christ with muscles and in flesh tones, that Joyce achieved in transplanting Ulysses to Dublin and turning him into a wandering Jew, these are due to this dialectic, this consistent *double entendre*, as an inherited system of symbols is exploited and remade by the artist.

And the humanities. The humanities are not, except incidentally, the repositories of an art's or profession's techniques for doing things successfully; nor it their business directly to write poems or fight battles or legislate for society. They are the disciplines that comment on and appraise such activities, that reflect on their meaning and seek to clarify the standards by which they should be judged. The humanist scholar detaches himself, as it were, from that in which his fellows engage with passionate commitment. Yet his detachment is not an act of rejection; nor is it a useless frill. It grows, usually, from affection, from a desire to understand more deeply and appreciate more intensely what has aroused one's sense of beauty or awe. And it contributes to that atmosphere of informed expectation, to that audience whose sympathies are broad but whose standards are severe, in which every first-rate talent in every field flourishes best. The humanities are parasitical, but they also enrich that on which they feed.

Nevertheless, it is intelligible that humanistic scholars are often resented and seen as killjoys or trouble-makers. They are lovers of man's works but strange lovers -- ironical, resistant, and seeming to prefer talk and talk about talk to the straightforward embrace of that which they love. They are like the Unitarian minister of whom it was said that there was one thing he preferred to heaven, and that was a lecture on heaven. Thus Nietzsche's condemnation of Socrates. Socrates was a critic, a philosopher, a mere parasitical second-order mind. He fed on other people's vitality; he took the passionate and turned it cold. He made the unconscious conscious and there separated the Greek genius from its Dionysian inspiration.

If we turn Nietzsche's judgment of Socrates, which is perverse, into an observation about the character of humanistic scholarship, it takes on, however, a certain truth. It grossly overstates that truth, yet the account of the humanities I have given is incomplete if we do not recognize the inherent danger in the humanistic disciplines, and one to which humanistic scholars do succumb from time to time.

To take my own discipline, philosophy, it is possible for philosophers to detach themselves so completely from primary materials that they no longer offer commentaries on science or law or education but rather commentaries on the commentaries on the commentaries. Philosophy then becomes an exchange of memoranda between fellow members of a closed club who live by taking in one another's laundry and have forgotten the original business that brought them together.

In every humanistic discipline there is a necessary and desirable concentration on refining the ideas and tools which the discipline has developed over the centuries, and which it needs to do its work. But no one who has ever contributed greatly to a humanistic discipline has been without a larger passion that he has brought to that discipline from outside it, a social or moral or religious passion, or an intellectual curiosity that was not merely idle but painful and urgent.

And if it is painful for most people to have their activities analyzed and their joys dissected, it is also important to see that humanists engage in these exercises themselves with divided feelings. It is their capacity to maintain involvement and detachment in equilibrium that is always on trial; and it is the larger society's capacity to tolerate and appreciate such a state of precarious balance that gives the measure of its level of civilization. For this strange humanistic exercise in involvement and detachment rests on a certain faith: it is the faith that as human beings grow more conscious of themselves and what they are doing, more self-aware and more self-critical, they do not reduce their enjoyment of life, they intensify it; it is the faith that discrimination and taste do not weary the emotions but make them fresh.

Curiously, we ask, what use are the humanities? What good do they do? And the answer is not there to find because we look for a chain of causes and effects, we look down the line for a distant result. But the result is immediate: it is in the difference of each individual's experience if he or she knows the background of what is happening, if one has the metaphors and symbols that can give experience a shape. Think of what the lore and legend, the studies and arguments, that surround baseball, contribute to our enjoyment of that game. They <u>make</u> the game, as anyone can discern

by sitting next to someone who is uninitiated. Would anyone say, what is the use of all that talk, all those stories all that reporting -- let us just get on with throwing and hitting the ball?

These observations take me to a second of the polarities that seem to me to characterize the humanists. It is their mixture of concern for an impersonal or scientific objectivity and their irrepressible elements of personal idiosyncracy. Take historians whose works are monuments of the discipline of history -- Thucydides, Gibbon, Lord Acton, as three examples. Their effort to make sure of their sources, to evaluate alternative explanations, to get the facts just right, to connect the stories they tell with principles that do not apply to these stories but to broad ranges of human experience -- all this qualifies them as scientific minds. They were impelled by an ideal of truth as that from which personal preference, prevailing prejudices, individual quirks have been removed. Yet the work they produced bears their own unmistakable individual mark, as clearly as a work of Dickens or a poem of Yeats bears the mark of its creator. We cannot confuse them with anyone else.

I would not for a moment suggest that the humanistic disciplines are not disciplines; I do not mean to suggest that they are entirely expressive or lyric in their functions. But they partake of the lyric. At their most vivid, they are like the arts as well as the sciences. The humanities are that form of knowledge in which the knower is revealed. All knowledge becomes humanistic when this effect takes place, when we are asked to contemplate not only a proposition but the proposer, when we hear the human voice behind what is being said. And the humanities sink into pedantry when they lose this quality. They no longer give us knowledge with commitment.

Whitehead speaks somewhere of the difference between significant knowledge and knowledge that is inert -- knowledge which gives us no sense of its bearing on our lives or its connections with the image we entertain of human nature and destiny. One function of the humanities is to bring knowledge alive, to put it to moral and philosophical use; and one way in which the humanities serve this function is to maintain the ironic tension between the personal and the impersonal.

But let me turn now to a more obviously public and civic function of the humanities. For almost two hundred years, during the period when modern humanistic studies took their distinctive shape, there took place in France and England an intense debate among scholars and men of letters known as "The Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns." The Greek and Roman writers had been revived. Were their works to be presented to the European mind as models of achievement and wisdom which artists, writers and critics could do no better than to imitate? Were these ancient personages,

the creators of an extraordinary tradition, to be viewed as authority-figures? Or could it be supposed, as the "moderns" argued, that the life of a civilization was like the life of an individual, and that it was the years that came later that were the maturer years?

It was living men and women, the "moderns" argued, who were the true Ancients. They stood on the shoulders of their predecessors, benefitted from the accumulated experience of the ages, and could see farther than their predecessors who had come at the dawn of civilization. Accordingly, it was incumbent on teachers, scholars and critics of literature, history, the arts or philosophy not to bow down before the authority of the past. Matthew Arnold characterized a modern age as one that is characterized by a general tendency to criticize received dispensations. In this sense, the Greek enlightenment was a modern age, and it was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the self-conscious modernity of our own civilization took shape. The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns played a crucial part in the process.

I offer this example as one among many. The humanistic disciplines are caught curiously between the poles of continuity and change, piety and rebellion. Few of these disciplines can be understood except as parts of a continuing historical tradition. They are rooted in problems, symbols, judgements, values that come to us from the past; they are among our principal means for maintaining continuity with that past. And if we do not, we are without bearings for the future. But in no dynamic and rapidly changing society is it possible to maintain continuity with the past merely by acts of veneration. It has to be brought to life -- and that means it has to be interpreted and reinterpreted. This is a major function of the humanities.

We cannot underestimate its significance. The modern world, almost by definition, is a world in which new knowledge and techniques produce rapidly changing social conditions, which in turn produce vertiginous changes in human beliefs and values. The coherence that people have thought they have seen in things is regularly broken; their sense of connectedness with what has gone before and of an intelligible direction in where they are going is disrupted. Humanistic scholars are more knowledgeable, perhaps, yet they are only occasionally wiser than their fellows. They are usually as lost as their unscholarly neighbors. But surely the effort to find coherence, to restore a sense of continuity and direction, cannot be left only to visionaries or sloganeers, or, since I am at it, to newspaper men or leaders of political parties.

If people with knowledge of philosophy, literature and history do not take part, if people who have time specifically set aside for them to permit them to think do not take part, the results will be

thin and fragile. And humanistic scholars have performed this function in the past -- Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill, to take two examples from Victorian England, George Santayana, Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Dewey, Perry Miller, Richard Hofstadter, to take some disparate examples from twentieth-century American intellectual history.

III

The Federal Government, of course, cannot support the humanities by itself. Even in recent years its financial contributions have been marginal as compared to the contributions of state and municipal governments, and of private libraries, museums, foundations and individual philanthropists. Nor should we imagine that the financial aspect of the problem is grave from the point of view of the Federal budget. I happen to be among those who believe in fiscal caution at this moment; nor would I wish to argue that part of the Federal budget devoted to support of the humanities is the only part that should not be inspected stringently. But on a comparative basis, the amounts spent by the Federal Government for the humanities are not large; and it is not here that the battle of the budget is going to be won or lost.

Yet what the Federal Government does will be critical. We are probably not in a period of growth. But the humanities will be diminished if they do not receive that extra support from government which they are unlikely to receive anywhere else. And they will be diminished not only in size, not merely in the material aspects of their needs, but in what is most important -- their own sense of themselves and their potential role in the world. Nothing has happened of greater importance in the history of American humanistic scholarship than the invitation of the government to scholars to think in a more public fashion, and to think and teach with the presence of their fellow-citizens in mind. It would be tragic if that invitation were now made less urgent, or if it were withdrawn.

For humanistic scholarship grows, in the end, it develops confidence, freshness, original ideas, only when it is fed not by its own professional concerns alone but by the doings of human beings outside the study. Those doings are the humanities' primary materials. And when humanistic scholars have been persuaded that they really were part of the larger community of their fellows they have also made the largest contributions to their own disciplines. Plato, Machiavelli, John Locke, James Madison, are not remembered for being intellectual recluses. Indeed, there is one thing above all which a government can do for humanist scholars. It can give them a larger, better informed, more demanding audience -- an audience that expects them to write well, and to think well, and to think along with it, the public. But in this enterprise the humanist scholars must themselves cooperate.

PART II THE STATE PROGRAMS: ORIGINS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

A Brief History of the State Humanities Programs — NEH Div. of State Programs Staff — 31

This report outlines the history of the state programs from their inception in 1970 as an experiment in public uses of the humanities, through the programs' early stages up to the 1976 reauthorization.

1976 and After: "New Directions" for State Programs — James P. Smith & Rudi Anders — 37

The 1976 reauthorization law "included a provision which expressed Congress's intent to enlarge the range of content of state program activities. The idea was to give to the state programs the prerogative of adding to projects focusing on public policy issues programs representing the full scope of the humanities." This report outlines the new program categories created in response to this mandate.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STATE HUMANITIES PROGRAMS*

The National Endowment for the Humanities, established by Congress in 1965, makes over 2,000 grants a year in support of research, education, fellowships and stipends, and public activities in the humanities. One of the Endowment's six operating divisions is the Division of State Programs.

NEH's State Program emerged out of the Congressional charge to the Endowment to promote projects in the humanities which (a) foster increased public understanding and use of the humanities; and (b) relate the humanities to current conditions of national life. This program makes funds available to a humanities entity in each state, and that entity in turn makes grants to existing organizations, institutions, and agencies to support activities, projects, and programs in the humanities.

The program was initiated in 1970 on an experimental basis. From the beginning, the state program involved volunteers, who would be enlisted in the effort to bring the humanities to a wider public. The first six committees were constituted in three ways: two grants were made to state arts councils to develop a humanities program as a part of their program (Oklahoma and Maine); two were made through the cooperation of university continuing education or extension divisions (Missouri and Georgia); two were made to committees created de novo, as subsequently became the standard practice (Oregon and Wyoming).**

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* This essay is a collective effort of the staff of the National Endowment for the Humanities Division of State Programs.

**The committees that had been created as part of state arts councils (Maine and Oklahoma) asked, independently, to be severed from the parent arts council when it became clear to both parties that the humanities program was so distinct from the primary goals of the arts council that a formal relationship was no longer helpful. Both committees then became independent volunteer committees following the national model. The two committees formed through the help of university continuing education (Missouri and Georgia) did not have a formal tie to the parent institution, and evolved into independent volunteer committees.

The Endowment chose to assist these new, volunteer committees for several reasons: Every state had a number of tax-supported and private agencies with a partial interest in the humanities, and nearly equal claims to be selected as the agency for an Endowment program in the state. These included the state historical societies, state archives, various museums, state and private libraries, universities, state arts and humanities councils. The existing groups, however, were designed to support only one or a few of the disciplines of the humanities, or were designed for more than one purpose (e.g., a library or a state arts council). A new organization was a way to give many of these groups a voice and at the same time address all of the humanities.

In addition, a new organization could focus on the single task of increasing public understanding and appreciation of the humanities. That focus could be emphasized by using a particularly American phenomenon -- volunteerism. By engaging citizens who were united through a common sense of purpose and dedication to the humanities, the Endowment expected that significant public programs in the humanities could be accomplished without putting in place a costly delivery system normative to most federal initiatives.

The basic principles of the state program were, for the most part, in place from the beginning, and were formally endorsed by the National Council of NEH in February 1972. Six principles formed the backbone of the program in each of the states. Those principles were:

1. The humanities should be central to all aspects of the committee's program.

2. Scholars in the humanities should be involved centrally in each project funded by the state committee.

3. All grants of a state committee should support projects dealing with public policy issues.

4. The committee should have a carefully chosen state theme, and the theme should be central to each project.

5. Projects should involve the adult, out-of-school public.

6. The committee objectives should be achieved by making grants.

Each state committee used its grant from the Endowment to: (1) hire a small staff (typically an executive director and a secretary in the first years), and (2) make grants (called "regrants"

by the committees and the Endowment) to non-profit groups and organizations within the state in response to applications successfully submitted against criteria listed above.

From FY 1971 through FY 1976, the staff at the Endowment, i.e., the staff of the state-based program within the Division of Public Programs, helped to sustain the committees in operation, and to develop committees in additional states.

The process used to help create a state committee was the same in each instance (after the first six grants). NEH staff would conduct preliminary research to identify the resources and humanistic institutions of the state under consideration, would prepare a list of names of individuals to be contacted, often totaling well over 100 persons. An NEH program officer would then initiate extensive telephone calls to these on the list, describing the state-based program, seeking advice about who might be particularly capable of taking part in the creation of such a program, and asking for advice about special concerns, opportunities, and issues that should be taken into account in launching a state program.

Following these calls, NEH staff would recommend the names of individuals who might form the planning committee. The Chairman would invite about six persons to come to Washington for a day and a half of more intense discussion of the program. Following this meeting, the participants would be encouraged to return to their state, expand their numbers, apply to the Endowment for a planning grant, and begin the process of shaping a program for their state.

Apart from these catalyst groups, the Endowment has had no role in selecting individuals for membership in the state committees. From 1971 until late 1976, the Endowment's stipulations were that committees should be broadly representative of their state, and consist of three groupings of equal size: one-third were administrators of cultural and educational institutions (who might be expected to help the committee organize and administer a Federal grant and grant-making activities, as well as serve as a voice for the institutions of the humanities); one-third who were scholars in the humanities (who might be expected to be sensitive to the substance of the humanities); and one-third who represented the general public (who were expected to be concerned about the public viability of suggested programs).

During the planning period, the catalyst group would (1) conduct a series of meetings throughout the state to which were invited organizations, groups, and individuals to discuss the program, determine what might be a successful state theme, and create preliminary interest in making applications to the committee; (2) employ a temporary staff; (3) expand its membership from the original group to one of about 20 members. When the process of planning and consultation was complete, the committee would apply to

the Endowment for operational funds. The planning period ranged from six months to a year or more, with the average being eight to nine months. Although many committees began their operations using informal procedures, all committees now have by-laws and some committees have incorporated as non-profit corporations in their state. Many have applied for and been granted "tax-exempt" [I.R.S. 501(c)3] status. Every committee has a fiscal agent, with the most agents being a college or university, banks, CPA's, or other independent firms.

The committees have benefited greatly from donated services. Frequently a college, university, or civic organization will provide quarters for the new program without cost, or at token cost. In the same way, fiscal services and supplies have been donated by educational institutions, historical societies, banks. Endowment policy required a match, in cash or in-kind, for all Endowment program funds. Committees, in turn, required such a match from their regrantees.

Committees vary considerably in the scope of their activities, with committees making an average of 40 regrants in FY 1976, and the range running from about 15 regrants (in Idaho) to more than 100 (Indiana). The average regrant cost in FY 1976 was about $6,000, with many small grants of less than $500, and a few for more than $50,000 (usually for television projects). A typical regrant is for a series of activities; for example, a regrant to a small public library to conduct a program of panel discussions on public access to the broadcast media might involve bi-weekly meetings for two months, and thus eight events.

We think a conservative estimate would be that each regrant produces an average of about five events. Thus, in FY 1976, at least 10,000 "events" sponsored by state committees took place throughout the nation.

The 1976 reauthorization legislation had four effects on the state program:

1. to be eligible for funding, each committee is required to submit a plan setting forth its procedures in such a way as to provide assurance to the Chairman that the committee is in compliance with the law;

2. each committee is given the responsibility to develop procedures and plans "in such a manner as will furnish adequate programs in the humanities;"

3. the Endowment is required to devote at least 20 per cent of its definite funds to the state program, and each eligible committee is assured

at least $200,000 per fiscal year; and

4. each committee is placed in a formal relationship to state government because the state government is given the options of (a) matching the Federal grant and appointing half of the members of the committees, or (b) appointing two members to the state committee.

The submission of a compliance plan for purposes of eligibility meant, for most states, a recodification of its by-laws and policies. The intent of this portion of the law is to insure mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness in each committee. The budgetary implications of the law are not profound, because the Endowment had obligated at least 20 per cent of its definite budget to the program each year, beginning in FY 1975.

The effects of the law were: to insure some forms of committee accountability to the citizens of its state; to provide assurance that the program and each committee within it would receive a certain amount of funding each year; to give each committee the responsibility for determining the humanities program it wished to provide for the state; and to give state governments at least two methods of participating in the activities of the state committees.

State programs are now operational in fifty states, Puerto Rico and Washington D.C. The program is of growing interest to Congress, to universities and colleges, to state and local historical societies and museums, to libraries, to educational television stations, to academic humanists concerned about public service, to many local organizations and institutions, and to various segments of the general public. Most committees, in response to the 1976 legislation, consulted with citizens throughout the state to determine what sorts of program activities would best serve the special needs and particular resources of that state. The new programs share many characteristics. More than half of the current programming in state programs relate the humanities to public policy issues and contemporary concerns -- the role of the family, minority and women's issues, problems of biomedical ethics, problems of land use, the future of energy use, etc. Almost without exception, the guidelines adopted by state committees require that programs be for the adult public.

1976 AND AFTER:

"NEW DIRECTIONS" FOR STATE PROGRAMS

by

James Smith and Rudi Anders

The 1976 Law which reauthorized the National Endowment for the Humanities and the state humanities programs included a provision which expressed Congress's intent to enlarge the range of content of state program activities. The idea was to give to the state programs the prerogative of adding to projects focusing on public policy issues programs representing the full scope of the humanities. In early 1979 the Federation sought to identify the ways the state programs have responded to this revised mandate. The summary which follows indicates that a wide variety of programs activities is underway. Study of guidelines and reports from the state programs reveals, however, that many states are still initiating and revising their extended program categories. Thus the summary to follow should not be read as a final report. It should also be kept in mind that the state programs vary considerably in labeling categories. Thus the ten categories used in the summary may not do justice to the unique aspects of various programs nor fully reveal the intentions of all categories. Such diversity demonstrates the vitality of the state humanities committees and illustrates the need to keep in mind the experimental character of the responses to the 1976 mandate.

JAMES P. SMITH is Associate Director of the Federation and RUDI ANDERS was a staff research associate of the Federation in 1979. This paper is a slightly revised version of a report done by the Federation as part of the review of 1980 Congressional reauthorization of the state humanities councils.

The ten headings to be discussed are:

1. Broadening of Public Policy;
2. Humanities Projects Per Se;
3. Culture and Heritage Projects;
4. Humanist-in-Residence Projects;
5. Fellowships;
6. Publications;
7. Humanist Seminars;
8. Resource Centers;
9. Planning, Development and Mini-Grants; and
10. Special Grants.

(1) Broadening of Public Policy Issues: In addition to supporting programs relating the humanities to specific public policy issues such as the right to bear arms or juvenile crime, a majority of states has broadened the definitions or established new categories of public policies which qualify for committee support. Nebraska now funds projects which explore "The application of the humanities to general public concerns such as the meaning of work, family life, changing social roles, moral choices, productive use of leisure time, ethnic identity, etc." This approach has led to the support of several projects concerned with the culture of native Americans in times of change. The North Carolina Humanities Committee has also opted for an enlarged scope: "We continue to support projects dealing with issues of public policy, but we also welcome projects that bring the resources of the humanities to bear on any significant aspect of human life and the modern world, including programs that focus on the humanities themselves and how they relate to life." One such project brought community leaders and humanists together for a ten-day series of workshops to analyze local policy issues. Many states support projects devoted to the special cultural, social and economic problems faced by refugees and immigrants. Similarly, the values and rights affected by divorce are treated in many projects

The broadening of the public policy issue category has not dislodged the primacy accorded public policy issues in the plans of the state committees. Projects in large and small states illustrate continuing interest in timely public policy issues. It has been predicted that by 2001 California will be bilingual. The California program responded by sponsoring a documentary film on the special problems and possibilities in a bilingual culture.

The experience of Canada, Mexico, Belgium and Switzerland were examined. In Delaware, as in most states, projects were supported which were held in conjunction with the Courses by Newspaper "Taxation: Myths and Realities" series. The Delaware program funded five articles on Delaware tax issues and sponsored a lecture series. The Delaware program also sponsors a series of 3 minute radio commentaries on timely topics such as the ERA, Pension Plans and the Jonestown tragedy. Humanities scholars prepare these talks for broadcast in six stations across the state. The Illinois Council sponsored a program on terrorism, in which Senator Frank Church and General Wm. Westmoreland were joined by historians, writers and religionists for the two day conference.

(2) Humanities Projects per se: At least a dozen states fund discipline-centered projects which focus on the subject matter of specific humanities disciplines. In a Minnesota project, examples and explanations were offered of the literacy and political creativity fostered in central Minnesota. Many states use cultural anthropologists to help understand the special features of regional culture, and the many programs taking the Holocaust as its central topic do so in terms of history, comparative religion and philosophy. Illinois supports projects which "focus primarily upon the substance and resources of the humanities themselves." A striking example is the Chicago Area History Fair, which provides history students the opportunity to display their work and be evaluated in a competition similar to that long used in Science Fairs. Iowa also now considers the financing of projects which "center on general topics of broad historical, philosophical, ethical, or literary value or interest. Such topics need not be related to public policy issues." For example, Iowa is supporting several conferences on literature for and about children, in conjunction with the International Year of the Child. Another variant of the humanities per se approach are projects which "feature the disciplines in the humanities in conjunction with the arts and/or sciences." The participation of the state programs in the national Einstein Centennial Celebration is an example of this approach.

(3) Culture and Heritage Projects: At least half the state programs have established funding categories for projects which interpret local history, culture or art. These are often intended to attract sponsorship by museums, historical societies and libraries. Such projects frequently include exhibits and other media formats, as well as interpretative material. Many states are reviving the Chautauqua idea as a basis for touring projects about local and regional culture. In Missouri there are projects for interpreting historical sites, and Texas recently supported a project which included a walking tour of the works of a well-known architect. Exhibitions, such as one in New York which, through photographs, woodcuts and drawings, depicted two centuries of women's work in New York City, have been supported by a number of states. Some programs, such as Connecticut's, have separate

categories for "Exhibits and displays which convey and interpret a knowledge of our cultural legacy using objects of our material culture to communicate ideas about our history and values." Most states have included such formats in social and cultural history categories "which consist of activities designed to enhance public knowledge of the historical background of particular groups, places or traditions." The North Dakota Committee's support of the prize-winning film "Northern Lights," the story of one year in the life of a young farmer committed to the Non-Partisan League, is an example, as are projects emanating from the National Bicentennial Program which most states supported.

(4) Humanist-in-Residence Projects: This category seeks, in the words of the Texas proposal, "to provide sufficient financial resources to ... employ... a fully qualified humanities scholar to assist the organization in (a) immediate public humanities programming, (b) long-range public humanities program development, (c) evaluating existing public programming in the humanities, and (d) understanding the humanistic dimensions of particular pressing social, political, cultural, or economic issues, through research, discussion, and writing." The many variants of this type of program include "traveling" humanists, "field" humanists and "summer" humanist programs. All seek to "reach groups or communities which have not actively been involved in public humanities programming" and in some instances to aid local groups in the development of proposals to be submitted for funding.

Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky and South Dakota are among the states which have active "humanist-in-residence" or traveling humanist programs. A 1978 project in Maine epitomizes the idea as it was reported in The Kennebec Journal which serves the capital city of Augusta:

> One of the things Maine's humanist-in-residence does is participate in "philosophic lunches" every Friday or so. A philosophic lunch, explained James Harrod, is one in which everyone brings his own meal; someone reads a short passage from the Bible, an anthropology book or some other work; and then the group discusses it.
>
> The noon discussions, Harrod said, are helping in one of the tasks the Department of Mental Health and Corrections has assigned to him--developing a philosophy for the department. He said the lunches, which were suggested by the Department Commissioner, have been successful. "One value I've found is that it gives people in the department a time to think back and reflect, to get away from the day-to-day crises," Harrod said. "There is no concrete product of the lunches, just sort of a breathing space."
>
> Besides developing a philosophy for the department, Harrod's primary task is to develop ways of integrating into the department's programs the families of people in its institutions. He is conducting a series of workshops or conferences

with such families and department professionals to develop the department's policy. "There are no existing policies on how to relate to families," Harrod said. "There is no coherent plan...I'm supposed to be a gadfly, a Socratic gadfly," he said. "My task is to raise questions. I'm not an expert in mental health or corrections."

But Harrod feels there will be beneficial results from his work. He said his pursuit of a department philosophy already has resulted in a stated philosophy in such department work as the mental health plan, the adult corrections plan and the juvenile plan. "Behind the goals and objectives, there should be a philosophy grounded in some sense of what it means to be human," Harrod said. The philosophy, he said, should identify what values and responsibilities the department has in relationship to the citizens of the state and to the department's clients and their families.

(5) Fellowships: Most states have rejected the idea of supporting scholarly research beyond what is required to implement a given project, but some states offer such awards for research which might otherwise not be done or for research which will ultimately be disseminated through public lectures, discussion programs or publication. Wyoming, for instance, awards research grants to "indivduals who focus on studies of Wyoming (or regional) literature, language, ethics, philosophy, jurisprudence, archaeology, history, ecology, the history, criticism of the arts, and comparative religion." Idaho's Fellowship and Summer Stipends program supports "independent study and research into cultural legacies and public concerns for scholars, teachers, and others who have the interest and ability to pursue inquiries in the humanities." In 1978 the Nebraska Committee awarded five Summer Stipends whose recipients were to produce papers to be presented later that year to public audiences. The papers include a "study of the similarity between the black characters in Alex Haley's Roots and the popular image of the American Indian as the noble savage," a philosophical examination of the arguments for and against capital punishment, tracing and writing the history of the Omaha Urban League, and examining the Renaissance humanists belief about marriage and family life.

Indiana is currently offering a fellowship for a humanist or scientist "who will travel throughout the state presenting public humanities programs on scientific or technological development." Topics for presentation can include "mythology and science, science in media, the influence of science on common language, natural science and religion, energy priorities, creativity and joy in the sciences, arts and humanities, public control of research, science and frontier life, science in Indiana, ethics for technicians, the Einstein Centennial or the social responsibility of scientific professions."

The Pennsylvania Fellowship Program has established certain priorities in the kind of research it wishes to support, but in a way this program is unique, for it allows the possibility of "a two-way exchange between the academic and public sector, either by placing humanists in non-academic settings or by bringing persons without professional involvement in the humanities into academic environments." These fellowships could "include residency situations for humanists in hospitals, dental clinics, police stations or other public institutions or agencies. On the other hand, the Committee will also consider applications from non-humanists for residency and research efforts centered in the academic community. For instance, local or regional planners might want to explore whether the resources of academic philosophy departments have something to contribute to the formulation of practical policies in the areas of land use, urban displacement or energy consumption." Unique in a different way is the California Writer's Fellowship for writers and journalists for the production of a publishable article. The recipient of the fellowship is "to research the statewide impact of the humanities in California: how the disciplines of philosophy, history, literature and language affect citizens' lives, public policy, academic excellence."

(6) Publication: A number of states have established program categories or have approved support for the writing and/or publication of humanities related articles, essays and monographs. Such support has been accorded in a number of ways and for a variety of reasons. Direct methods of support for funding humanist articles and essays include New Mexico"s solicitation of "Humanities Articles for Newspaper Publication in New Mexico." In that state, as well as Kentucky and Nevada, humanists have received stipends or honoraria for writing newspaper articles. Similarly the Pennsylvania project "Indiana County Heritage, A Magazine of Local History," Kentucky's "Adena: A Voice for a Region" and "Callaloo: A Black South Journal of Arts and Letters" support humanists as editors and contributors. An example of a publication serving a matter of general interest is "Shoah: A Newsletter of Holocaust Studies" supported by the Connecticut program. It is "designed to include listings of programs and courses on the Holocaust, specialized bibliographies, book and film reviews, reviews of programs and studies in foreign countries, and articles of special significance by scholars in the field."

Beyond these efforts, some states have established special grant categories for the publication of collections of essays or monographs. Connecticut's Occasional Papers series, in a journal format, has included the publications of eight papers on "Food and Social Policy" and issues projected for spring of 1979 are "one on Death and Dying, one on Technology and Culture."

Nevada's Halcyon, published in cooperation with the state historical society, features the annual address given at the state-wide humanities conference and other papers reflecting the activities of the humanities disciplines in the state. Pennsylvania's Public Papers in the Humanities series has published essays or studies which had their origins in previously funded projects. Mississippi and Nebraska have both published collections of essays dealing with the relationship of the humanities to "public policy" and "public life". New York has also funded the publication of essays and proceedings of symposia, while Rhode Island is considering "Book Awards" which might in some instances underwrite the publication of a manuscript by a commercial publishing house. North Dakota announced in mid-1978 that it was ready to award up to $30,000 to a nonprofit organization in North Dakota to administer the publishing of a volume about the state. By the end of that year 18 proposals had been received and it appears that the first volume of a series commemorating North Dakota's centennial will be published by June of 1980. These efforts show that the state committee sponsorship of publications by humanities writers is oriented to establishing sound relations between humanities scholarship and the general public.

(7) Humanist Seminars: Though not widely employed, this category too embraces a great variety of program activity. One type, exemplified by the California "Grants for Multidisciplinary Seminars" is "designed to encourage scholars from a wide variety of disciplines in the humanities to address in a sustained fashion questions of fundamental importance to society." Other states have supported seminars between humanists and the professions. North Carolina has funded both "Invitational Seminars" with academic humanists and local professionals in order to increase the "participants' awareness of the major value problems which the community faces," and programs designed expressly for humanists in discussions with a particular profession such as medicine/health care. Wyoming's "Humanities and Life Work" programs are "intended to create a dialogue between the humanist-scholar and target groups of workers... to encourage interaction among academe and the public and to expand an appreciation of the relevancy of the humanities studies to the individual in his role as worker in contemporary society."

(8) Resource Centers: A few states, among them Indiana, Ohio, Texas, Alabama and Connecticut, have established and funded such centers through grants. The centers in these states have libraries of up to 1,000 items -- films, tapes, videotapes, articles, speeches, sample publicity materials -- which, through a published catalogue and other publicity, are made available throughout the state to groups wishing to conduct public humanities programs. The functions of

such centers include the collection and evaluation of media and printed materials, the design of "packaged programs," the publication of catalogues, and assistance in the writing of proposals. The Indiana Center has expanded its storage and distribution functions recently by initiating a program of outreach consultation for community groups and academic humanists. The question of whether such centers ought to be supported through grant funds or whether these should become part of a state programs's regular budget has not been clearly resolved. Several states have awarded grants to science museums to coordinate and distribute a travelling exhibit for the national Einstein Centennial Celebration, creating in effect short-term special purpose resource centers. Many states report strong committee interest in the cost-effective features of resource centers and it is likely that the Indiana example will be duplicated in many regions.

(9) Planning, Development and Mini-Grants: At least a dozen states have this grant category. In the case of Alabama, such grants either provide for the honorarium and expenses of a humanist to assist a group in developing an idea for a project or in "providing limited support to assist groups with little knowledge of grant writing, or groups planning long-range or complex projects." Frequently these grants seek to equalize chances for project approval, as in the case of Pennsylvania's Planning or Pilot Grants, which were designed to address the particular needs of ad hoc groups and "to give the poor, the disadvantaged, the handicapped or the elderly special access to the Committee's funding opportunities." The use of funds for planning grants in Kansas encourages "the greater use of humanists in the planning period, prevents the application process from creating hardships on non-profit organizations, provides support to informally organized community groups wanting to participate in the KCH program." The Texas committee, which has made planning grants available almost from the start of its grant-making activities, found that until recently nearly all these grants yielded subsequent proposals which were funded. A more recent trend, however, seems to indicate that fewer and fewer grants have resulted in "quality" proposals; several changes in Texas planning grants have been suggested. The changes would require that such planning grant proposals be more tightly structured, that the grant program be more restrictive, that there be tighter control of how planning grant monies are spent and that there be increased humanist involvement in the planning period.

A number of states have established mini-grant programs in order to more effectively reach certain potential sponsoring groups. Libraries, civic groups, community organizations, PTA's, museums and church groups may be especially interested in these grants since local issues and/or "packaged" programs can be simply and speedily funded through mini-grants. In many cases they are readily administered by the regular staff or resource center staff

on specially prepared application forms; the committees control the amounts to be allocated in mini-grants by specifying an upper total limit and upper limits for individual mini-grant applications. Ohio's mini-grant program seems to be typical of most; grants are available to support "1) small conferences and community forums including those which seek to respond quickly to current public policy issues or community concerns, 2) innovative projects or formats designed to stimulate interaction between humanities scholars and other adults, 3) additional utilization or previously funded OPH projects, or 4) under special circumstances, planning for larger projects which require special costs at the initial stages and which are undertaken by groups without continuing resources."

Mini-grants in the states vary in size but the average amount, usually granted by agreement of the Chairperson and the Executive Director within a few weeks after receipt of a proposal (in a simplified form), is under $1,000. The mini-grant option is now an important one in many states. In Ohio, for example, 50 proposals for mini-grants were received between February 1978 and April 1979. Of this number, 33 were given approval or conditional approval. The mini-grants, for conferences or forums or for the additional utilization of materials from previously funded Ohio projects, ranged from $250 to $1,000. The average grant was $885. Mini-grants, in short, have proven to be an excellent and cost effective means of providing public access to the humanities.

(10) Special or Innovative Grants: Many states have special grant categories which seem basically designed as "catch-alls" for innovative or interesting projects which would otherwise not fit into regular categories. For some states, such as Ohio and Washington, "special" or "experimental" grants are those "without a public policy focus" or grants for projects which "move beyond the exclusive support of dialogue on public policy issues." A Massachusetts project supports teachers, actors and musicians who travel by bus among the towns in western Massachusetts, stimulating public discussion about local culture and issues. The Washington Humanities Commission funded a project to place illustrated epigrams in Seattle city buses. Cards for responses were placed near the posters for use by riders. Delaware has used its special category to fund small discussion group series which require the participation of a "professional in the humanities" and the topic to be cleared with the DHF. Tennessee has funded nine special grants for regional conferences which "will examine the potential role of the humanities in individual and community life." Georgia and Wisconsin have funded film/discussion series under this category. In fact, Wisconsin has set aside ten percent of its program funds for Innovative Program Grants which experiment "with new ways to increase public awareness, use, and appreciation of the humanities. New approaches to the humanities disciplines, new program settings, and new audiences are encouraged." Pennsylvania's special pro-

grams have included the funding of a special issue of an arts journal in the project titled "Art Criticism: Its Effect on the Art Community and the Public at Large." Funding has also been extended to a film dealing with the older Black college in the United States and to a "project focusing upon bilingual community resources" in the pioneering programming efforts of the Puerto Rican community in Philadelphia.

This summary, as we have said, is very much a report in progress. As the new grant categories take shape, experience grows in their use and new ones develop, state humanities programs will certainly display the variety intended in the 1976 legislation. And as the results of "New Directions" become better known their benefits will demonstrate also the vitality of the original mission and the growth of public interest in state sponsored humanities programs.

PART III THE HUMANITIES AND . . .

. . . Public Policy — Robert Klaus — 49

Robert Klaus discusses the difficulties in linking the humanities with public policy debate. "The nature of the humanities suggests that a solution may never be found. Nonetheless, humanities scholars themselves must assume a major portion of the responsibility in telling the public what it is that they do and why it is important. They must meet the public half way."

. . . the Arts — Alan Shusterman — 53

Alan Shusterman urges cooperation between arts councils and humanities committees. "How can we, as administrators and as people trying to serve what is best in culture, forcibly separate the writing of stories from the writing of essays, history from fiction, drama from criticism, the arts as performance as an expression and critique of the social fabric and the people who make it up." We should have, he says, "an open sensitivity to the natural interdependence of our administratively separate worlds."

. . . Science — James P. Smith — 59

Most public humanities programs have funded projects which deal with science in terms of its moral values to society as opposed to viewing science and technology as cultural institutions. "The main issue appears to be whether activities can be designed which enable the public to attend to the total spectrum of values marking the presence of science and technology in contemporary culture. This section reviews some ideas which might stimulate new approaches to resolve this issue."

. . . the Social Sciences — Michael Sherman — 69

This exchange of letters displays the efforts of a state program and project administrator to define who is a humanist and who is a social scientist, their similarities and differences. This effort illuminates a problem faced in many state committees -- what are the humanities and what specifications should be included in the grant guidelines to ensure "humanistic" participation by experts?

THE HUMANITIES AND PUBLIC POLICY

by

Robert Klaus

In 1965 the Congress, along with colleges, churches, courts, and a variety of other institutions, appeared to be borne along by what now seems the inflated claims of relevancy. A child of the Great Society, it was felt that the National Endowment for the Humanities should not become the exclusive preserve of institutions of higher learning, but rather should attempt, however clumsily, to relate the humanities to the lives of the citizens.

From the first, associating relevancy with the humanities prompted a glut of debate that has tended recently to degenerate into cliches about elitism and populism. The state programs of the NEH, which bear the principal burden of implementing the Congressional fiat for relevancy, have, since their organization in 1971, been in the midst of this debate.

Until very recently state programs were allowed to underwrite only those programs which related the humanities--history, liter-

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ature, jurisprudence, philosophy, etc.--to a specific public policy issue. There was, in the thinking of John Barcroft, first director of the Endowment's state program, compelling reason to demonstrate to post-Sputnik America that issues of public policy should not, and indeed could not, be resolved only by the methods of technology and quantification. Public issues were not, after all, self-generating; nor did they possess their own internal dynamic and logic. They were, above all, historical developments, and despite efforts to invest them with the clinician's precision, they were issues of unfixed and perhaps unfixable dimension; they were questions of value. And, reasoned Barcroft, in a country that has no secular tradition of discussing values, the state programs might well serve to fill the vacuum. It was and remains a noble experiment.

But the problems suggested by the legal demands for relevancy continued to invalidate, as it were, the experiment's results. Critics, especially academics, argued that the state-based programs compromised the integrity of the humanities and merely confused the very issues they sought to examine. Some of this criticism, since it is anchored in the conviction of academy backbenchers that the humanities do not and should not have anything to do with public policy issues, may be dismissed as schoolish caviling. However, the critique of those humanists who have participated in state programs bears some consideration.

Generally speaking, these critics have indicated that the public policy issue fixation of the state programs may be said to have three principal shortcomings. First, many issues of public policy do not lend themselves readily to humanities discussion. In some situations the most procrustean of efforts have been made to connect, say, for the purposes of emphasis, existentialism with the construction of a secondary sewage treatment plant. In this instance it would certainly be true that the humanities were trivialized and the public policy issue obscured.

Again, the public issue requirement serves to invite what has come to be called "problem solving," and thus to imply that the humanities are both ameliorative and utilitarian. They are neither. Finally, the connection of public issues with the humanities often results in the overlaying of the humanities with the rococo jargon that now seems to attend the discussion of the public's affairs. The humanities have a distinct and respected tradition of good writing and common sense. They need have no recourse to the scientisms invoked to "legitimize" the imprecisions of literature, history, or philosophy.

But while the public policy issue requirement may have produced programs that appeared both forced and contrived, it also, nonetheless, provided the humanities--and humanists--with an opportunity to develop a much needed public constituency. Humanists are fragmented by disciplines and by specialties within these disciplines.

Many are reluctant, according to James Banner, professor of history at Princeton, to engage, as professionals, the larger issues of their society. "As a result," he points out, "(their) work is often dismissed as peripheral to important public questions and is considered luxurious elitism. . ." Connecting issues of public policy with the humanities therefore serves to counter this impression and to show that the humanities are, or should be, an essential part of public life.

Yet for most people--including those with university degrees--the humanities have very little, if any, meaning. They are routinely confused with humaneness, humanitarianism, and the cult of humanism; rarely are they regarded as intellectual disciplines. Just how perlexed the public is may be illustrated by a remark made to me when I was explaining the mission of the Iowa Humanities Program to a group of packinghouse representatives. After I had mentioned the "humanities," one of the junior executives assured me that I had nothing to worry about because "we have a clean kill-floor and we were just inspected a week ago." The remark would not appear so absurd were the idea of the humanities not so confounded in the public's mind. Given instances like this and others equally pathetic, it is difficult to dispute Banner's claim that the "case for the significance of the humanities is not being made."

In an essay in the American Historical Review ("The Age of Reinterpretation," October 1960) the distinguished historian C. Vann Woodward upbraided his colleagues for their failure of imagination in keeping their audiences interested. Historians write, he concluded, for other historians or captive students. Woodward's observation may, it would seem fair to say, be extended to include other humanists as well; and close in-breeding produces, within the humanities, as it does in nature, imperceptible but nonetheless fatal defects. Similarly, Woodward's warning that historians, no matter how perceptive, will be ignored if they evade issues of public policy may likewise be extended to other scholars. For Woodward the humanities have no definition outside of their relationship to things public.

How then may the problem of linking the humanities with public policy discussions be resolved? The nature of the humanities suggests that a solution might never be found. Nonetheless, humanities scholars themselves must assume a major portion of the responsibility in telling the public what it is that they do and why it is important. They must meet the public halfway.

And while there are a number of good reasons for limiting this responsibility, there are also impediments--both institutional and professional--which can make the carrying out of this responsibility unpleasant at best. Those humanists who participate in programs sponsored by state committees should be supported and encouraged by their departments and their colleges. This participation must not be regarded as busywork nor compared unfavorably with the "real" work of humanists.

THE HUMANITIES AND THE ARTS

by

Alan Shusterman

I want to emphasize the necessity for cooperation between arts and humanities organizations. It is a necessity imposed not particularly by the demands of the public, or Congress or state legislatures, or by special groups. Instead, I think the humanities and arts themselves demand that the connections be made.

Let me say at the beginning that I understand the many good -- and probably compelling -- reasons for keeping arts and humanities endowments and state programs separate from one another. The reasons stem from practical and historical differences in the institutions promulgating the arts and humanities in society: museums and other cultural institutions, theater groups, artist guilds on one hand, and educational institutions -- schools,

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Editor's Note: There are several important reasons for the interest of state humanities programs in the arts and the work of state arts councils as well as other public arts organizations. These include: similarities in purpose and structure, overlapping creative and critical traditions, common audiences and the possibility of cooperative activities. There are now complimentary needs to explore those areas at the same time the differences between the two fields are clarified. These issues and others were considered at a conference organized by the Federation, the Spring Hill Center in Minnesota and the Affiliated State Arts Agencies of the Upper Midwest. A report on that conference appeared in Federation Reports (Volume II, Number 1, September 1978). It should be noted that several features of Shusterman's paper, including the concept of "counter structures," are deliberately provocative, a testing of some very basic assumptions about the relation between arts and humanities programs. The paper is offered here not because it speaks for all committee and staff members but because it speaks to them in an informed and serious way.

colleges, universities and libraries -- on the other. Also the needs of artists and the arts are often quite different from those of humanists and the humanities. Artists require the basic financial assurance to allow them to create and promote their enterprises; humanists, though, need incentives to cross-fertilize and open their work, and to draw the public into their processes. Finally, I think that an excellent case can be made, on both the federal and state levels, that larger agencies and bureaucracies inhibit institutional responsiveness and do not decrease costs. National and state programs in the arts and humanities have been, in large measure, models of intelligence and responsiveness, that is in comparison to most other government agencies. In part, these are functions of small size.

So it is reasonable to have two major cultural agencies. On the other hand, it is not reasonable to assume that, because Congress created two endowments, therefore the humanities and arts are always clearly distinguishable from one another, if only we work hard to do so. That assumption is made, either explicitly or implicitly, with disturbing frequency. It should be challenged as strongly as possible. As we all know, legislative decision making procedures are not based on a God-given great chain of being. The existence of two endowments does not negate the question of overlap. The arts-humanities connection is important if content and quality of programs are to be considered.

The interdependence of the practice, theory, history and criticism of the arts presents the clearest case for bringing together the arts and humanities. Congressional definitions separate the arts from the study of the arts. Certainly it is possible to have a performance without explicit criticism, or a history without critical theory, but each element is made weaker by the separation. The great critic, Harold Rosenberg, who died recently, made the point very well in a New Yorker review of an exhibition of works by American painter Stuart Davis. Rosenberg noted that the exhibition catalogue emphasized the relationship between the works and the changes in art and society. He commented that "this intellectual emphasis is an innovation in catalogue writing and could contribute a great deal to survey exhibitions of most major modern artists. In our time, theories are responsible for much that takes place in the studios -- they even account for programs of suppressing theories in favor of recording optical phenomena or practicing automatism, or 'self-expression.' Modern styles evolved out of concepts, and no modern man has a monopoly on the exploitation of theory in the practice of painting."

How can we, as administrators and as people trying to serve what is best in culture, forcibly separate the writing of stories from the writing of essays, history from fiction, drama from criticism, the arts as performance from consciousness that the performance

is an expression and critique of the social fabric and the people who make it up? What are we separating? French experimental novelist Alain Robbe-Griellet flatly states that the order of a narrative "is not at all an exercise in style engaged in by a few privileged individuals cut off from the world but exactly the same thing as the social order, political order, and moral order of the society in which the literature develops." I could go on, and I will return to some of the more practical overlaps for state programs in a minute, but the major point is this: the separation between the arts and humanities exists at primarly a superficial level. Yes the forms are different. Yes there are different structures serving the arts and humanities. Yes one can define the institutional roles differently. Yes the creation of humanities relies somewhat more on cognitive skills and the creation of the arts relies more on intuitive perceptions and craftsmanship (although even here the divisions are breaking down). Yes one can tell the dancer from the critic.

Yet as soon as we strip away the outer layers of appearance and ask how these forms and ideas live and breathe, come into being, develop and die: how they operate in our world, form our society--then the overwhelming interdependence and unity of the arts and humanities are immediately evident. As an administrator, I would like to shape a program which makes the connection not between the surface of culture and the surface perceptions of people, but directly and powerfully, heart and mind to heart and mind. If we want to defend ourselves against those critics who refer to state programs as "crayons for everybody," we must operate at such a high level of understanding.

In one respect, we are unfortunate to be working with a system which encourages division just where unity is most needed. Nonetheless the problem is not overwhelming. It is the nature of all systems and structures, however well conceived, to create gaps. Had we not broken apart the humanities and arts, we would have severed some other crucial linkage. As a remedy, then, I like to operate by a theory of administrative counterprocedures and counterstructures. I recommend the idea to you. When working in a bureaucracy, it is administratively simplest to create substructures in your own image. A good example of this quite natural tendency is the National Endowment for the Arts and the state arts commissions. They mutually reinforce and critique one another, and they share most of the same purposes. Lines of communications are relatively simple. However the cracks and lines in the original system are made deeper by the second structure. I would propose -- as an experiment -- some counterstructures. For example, since states have separate arts and humanities councils, perhaps local or county agencies, if established, should be multidimensional, dealing with humanities, local history and the arts. Terms of approval would be negotiated at the state level, and the local agencies would have multiple associations and administrative

allegiances. (Their primary interest, of course, would be the locale and disciplines, not the state agencies.) The idea is only a suggestion. I'm not sure that such agencies are necessary or if they are that they should receive state or federal administrative support. Another example of counterstructure could appear within one agency's guidelines. At the Indiana Committee for the Humanities, for example, we have a small experimental application category which, simply, accepts humanities projects which do not fit other guidelines. It is an open door.

We all have an obligation to deduce our priorities from first the needs of society and second the highest accomplishments of our disciplines, not from the necessities of our structures. Creators often ignore the limits of form. For example, would you advise Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to go to the arts or humanities endowment for support of his next work? The answer is not clear. We have an obligation to be especially gentle to those grant requests which fall on the line. They are often the best projects. Our borders must be marked with flowers and trees. We don't need a wall. And if, occassionally, a project with fifty percent humanities content received funding from an arts commission, or a discussion project with a majority of costs going to an arts production receives a grant from a humanities committee, we should applaud the flexibility, not criticize the violation of doctrine.

How do you bring the humanities and arts together? That's like asking how do you bring Romeo and Juliet together. You get out of their way. We don't need elaborate mechanisms. All we must do is be careful that we do not exaggerate our congressionally-imposed restrictions when dealing with others. Further, we should work to remove the harnesses which limit the public's participation in our programs. We must discourage the academic isolation and specialization of the humanities, and the tendency of some arts to remain at the basic levels of technique or recreation, rejecting their own intellectual heritage and context. Since we are all public, we must continually work to balance the needs and abilities of the creators and thinkers with the demand for accessibility.

Arts and humanities programs will benefit if some grant projects cover both areas. Arts programs will develop more coherence, more of a rationale through the inclusion of the humanities, thus beginning to answer critics such as Joseph Wesley Zeigler who asks for more "hard questions," more "philosophers" for the arts. The humanities also can help educate the public about the arts, so that interest will be not just in more art but in better art. Government expansion, as we all know, is not eternal, and the arts in the future will be asked more and more to justify their importance to society. The question, and its many answers, are the province of the humanities.

The humanities can benefit from inclusion of the arts in programs because the arts are a primary material for the humanities. Particularly in the area of public programs -- the province of state humanities committees -- the inclusion of the arts in projects gives participants a common experience which then may be analyzed and discussed. One of our major problems is finding a starting point for the public. To cite an actual example, one cannot begin a discussion of spirituality in twentieth century art among people who have not seen the paintings and sculptures to be discussed. The topic of spirituality is important for the humanities because it opens the door to a greater knowledge of the transformations which religious images and feelings have undergone in our secular time. The arts can encapsulate or distill the humanities'social concerns. They can make the concerns visible and accessible to vast, dissimilar audiences and open a common ground for discussion. We in the humanities could not ask for more.

Briefly, I would like to list a few of the arts related projects funded either exclusively by the Indiana Committee for the Humanities or in conjuction with the Indiana Arts Commission. Humanities committee criteria are as follows: we are willing to fund artistic presentations, displays, readings, performances and creations when they are to take place in a context of organized discussion or criticism. In most cases, projects also meet other goals: they are part of a coherent project theme or idea, they emphasize the relationship between the artistic creations and some social concerns, and they show an unusual potential for bringing the humanities to a new audience. The last point is often fulfilled with an outreach program which, for example, may take vignettes and discussion from a repertory theater's production and present them in a hospital, nursing home or prison.

Projects have involved the following subjects: poetry readings with formal discussions; seminars on poetry in foreign languages and sign languages for the deaf (exploring the problem of translation); poetry writing and readings as a means of understanding social issues for retired persons and children. Dramatic presentations and films of dramas have been given in four or five locations, with ICH supporting discussions, outreach programs, lectures, extensive historical or critical program notes, and a portion, usually small, of production costs. We have also supported symposia and festivals on arts-related matters. Included have been a two day forum and display of the craft of building historical musical instruments. We have supported a symposium in conjunction with unveiling of an abstract public sculpture, a conference for media arts critics on their vocation and responsibility, a magnificent symposium of women's arts, a Shakespeare festival in Terre Haute and a Renaissance festival in Muncie.

That is not all of it, but I have given you a good sample. I see no problem in explaining how the based purpose of these projects is in line with our guidelines, even if the arts play a central role. Expecially if they do. We have cooperated only informally with the Indiana Arts Commission. Such things as joint board meetings, local cultural councils, mutual support in state funding, interagency liaison, and cooperation on state arts/humanities conferences are under preliminary discussion. They may come later.* We have begun with just an open sensitivity to the natural interdependence of our administratively separate worlds.

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* Several states have established joint arts/humanities programs.

THE HUMANITIES AND SCIENCE

by

James P. Smith

Public humanities programs on topics drawn from science and technology have been, for the most part, concerned with the kind of issues which arise when the absorption of scientific and technological products and processes into social, commercial and political contexts creates unfamiliar pressures on the patterns of values which are typical of those contexts. Meanwhile there appears to be little activity directed to the examination of science and technology as cultural institutions. Here the issues are less exclusively identified with moral values; they refer as well to values involved, for instance, in the choices between methodologies and research priorities, in taking account of religious and educational implications, and in understanding the role of style and design in research and technology.

The immediate provocation for supposing that the latter approach should be given a more prominent place in program development is the intuition, shared by many in a variety of roles in the humanities, that in such projects as the Einstein Centennial Celebration* there is much that is germane to the missions of the state humanities programs. Translating that intuition into effective and sustained design and implementation of public programs (as is now done in programs supporting individual research and the development of courses and seminars) has stymied humanist administrators. The main issue appears to be whether activities can be designed which enable the public to attend to the total spectrum of values marking the presence of science and techno-

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* Sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey on a grant from NEH; the American Institute of Physics and the Federation are cooperating in implementing the project.

logy in contemporary culture.** This section will review some developments and ideas which might stimulate new approaches to resolve this issue.

An idea of the approach advocated in this section can be gained from a project supported by the Montana Committee for the Humanities. Called "Eclipse '79 Celebration" it was planned by a committee at Montana State University in Bozeman. The project was an inter-disciplinary, cross cultural, all-community event created to bear witness to a total solar eclipse visible on February 26th, 1979 and not to be seen again in the area for 300 years. Philosophers, poets, scholars of myth and ritual, potters, physicists, a Cheyenne medicine man and a Jungian scholar participated, each expounding on the significance of the eclipse for human experience from the standpoint of his or her specialty. One of the lectures is worth mention here: a philosopher of science critically examined the premisses and conduct of the famous eclipse expedition which in 1919 provided evidence of the bending of light rays, the first empirical support for Einstein's theory of relativity. The project application also says:

> The eclipse event is related to the MCH theme "Traditions in Transition." Tradition, understood as a rigid system of beliefs and customs, implies a single way of viewing reality. "Transition" suggests movement, a passing through or cutting across. The tradition in question in this project is the solar-centered culture of the west with its presumption of "central position." This tradition, however, is currently being eclipsed by a darker and perhaps deeper view which prefers the feminine to the masculine, the ecosystem to the egosystem, and the many-sideness of imagination to the single counters of a monolithic system.

** "Presence" is to be distinguised from "relationship to" and, while the distinction should not be exaggerated, it might be well to overemphasize it for the sake of discussion in order to call attention to the very generous use of such words as "impact of" and "implications of" in descriptions of scientific and technological topics in public humanities programs. The use of these formulas might well betray a presumption to the effect that science is somehow alien to all the rest of our institutional and cultural matrix, and that only at the "interface" are there issues of interest for humanists. This perpetuates the "two-cultures" thesis in a simplistic way, when it might be more fruitful to turn the analysis of it into a challenge for program development. (A bill to establish a Commission on the Impact of Science and Technology on Society, H.R. 13939, was introduced in the House of Representatives in August, 1978. It is replete with evidence of this presumption.)

> Tradition, however, is not destroyed in transitional processes. Just as the sun does not disappear during an eclipse, tradition remains intact. But after the darkening of the light, we can never see in quite the same way again. Our vision has been broadened and deepened.

State programs have not, according to the sample of descriptions now available, supported many projects of this nature. The majority of science-related projects have had to do with biomedical ethics, ecological implications of technology and value questions related to energy issues. A comprehensive program called "The Humanistic Implications of Science" was offered in Arizona. Another example is the project in Illinois, sponsored by the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, designed to "show that the sciences and the humanities are not opponents, but allies; and to indicate how they can work together in attacking such vital issues as energy sources, allocation and policy."

Several program development possibilities appear in themes of contemporary writers. George Steiner's book In Bluebeard's Castle* contains numerous observations which speak to our purpose. For example, his formulation of the "two cultures" thesis:

> Where culture itself is so utterly fragmented, there is no need to speak of the sciences as separate. What does make them so different from the present state of the humanities is their collectivity and inner calendar. Overwhelmingly, today, science is a collective enterprise in which the talent of the individual is a function of the groups. But as we have seen, more and more of current radical arts and anti-art aspires to the same plurality. The really deep divergence between the humanistic and scientific sensibilities is one of temporality. Very nearly by definition, the scientist knows that tomorrow will be in advance of today. A twentieth-century schoolboy can manipulate mathematical and experimental concepts inaccessible to a Galileo or a Gauss. For a scientist the curve of time is positive. Inevitably, the humanist looks back. The essential repertoire of his consciousness, the props of his daily life as a scholar or critic are from the past. A natural bent of feeling will lead him to believe, perhaps silently, that the achievements of the past are more radiant than those of his own age. The proposition that "Shakespeare is the greatest, most complete writer mankind will ever produce" is a logical and almost a grammatical provocation. But it carries conviction.

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* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971, pp. 113-135.

> And even if a Rembrandt or a Mozart may, in future, be equaled (itself a gross, indistinct notion), they cannot be surpassed. There is a profound logic of sequent energy in the arts but not an additive progress in the sense of the sciences. No errors are corrected or theorems disproved. Because it carries the past within it, language, unlike mathematics, draws backward. This is the meaning of Eurydice. Because the realness of his inward lies at his back, the man of words, the singer, will turn back, to the place of necessary beloved shadows. For the scientist time and the light lie before.
>
> Here, if anywhere, lies division of the "two cultures" or, rather, of the two orientations. Anyone who has lived among scientists will know how intensely this polarity influences life style. Their evenings point self-evidently to tomorrow, *e santo è l'avvenir*. (p. 133-135)

Steiner continues by questioning the cost paid for the scientific-technological revolutions, noting that though there have been a few critiques, such as those of Thoreau and Tolstoy, by and large the presumption in favor of the momentum has gone unchallenged. This is partly attributable to economic factors, but Steiner points to a deeper mechanism:

> . . . the conviction, centrally woven into the Western temper, at least since Athens, that mental inquiry must move forward, that such motion is natural and meritorious in itself, that man's proper relation to the truth is one of pursuer (the "haloo" of Socrates cornering his quarry rings through our history) . . . We are hunters after reality, wherever it may lead. The risks, the disasters incurred are flagrant. But so is, or has been until very recently, the axiomatic assumption and a priori of our civilization, which holds that man and the truth are companions, that their roads lie forward and are dialectically cognate.
>
> For the first time (and one's conjectures here will be tentative and blurred), this all-governing axiom of continued advance is being questioned. I am thinking of issues that go far beyond current worries in the scientific community about the environment, about weaponry, about the mindless applications of chemistry to the human organism. The real question is whether certain major lines of inquiry ought to be pursued at all, whether society and the human intellect at their present level of evolution can survive the next truths. It may be---and the mere possibility presents dilemmas beyond any which have arisen in history-- that the coming door opens onto realities ontologically opposed to our sanity and limited moral reserves. (p. 137)

He is in effect proposing an inquiry into the soundness of the general principle that knowledge is good.

The recent moratorium on recombinant DNA research raises many issues of this kind. Projects supported by the California and Indiana programs have taken up this issue. The Poynter Center at Indiana University sponsored a three-day conference on ethical, moral and social policy questions intrinsic in decisions on conducting recombinant DNA research. The proceedings were videotaped under a supplementary grant from the Indiana Humanities Council. The California project brings together humanists, scientists, public policy makers, educators, and representatives of the community to examine proposed policy resolutions of the problems raised by the recombinant DNA research. Among questions which were raised are these two (1) should representatives of the public (legislative and executive branches of local, state or federal government) declare a moratorium on recombinant DNA research? (2) are proposed federal and state regulations adequate to mitigate the risks of recombinant DNA research?

H. F. Judson's article* tells the story of the moratorium on recombinant DNA research up to 1975. The successful management of the moratorium by scientists leads Judson to the following conclusion, in effect, answering the first question posed in the description of the California project, at the same time it challenges one of the standard justifications for involving humanists in discussion of public policy issues related to science and technology.

> Most discussions of the control of science proceed, I think, from the wrong implicit model, a censorship model, but what's needed is precisely the reverse. The appropriate proverb is not, after all, *"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"* but *"Set a thief to catch a thief."* Committees of civil servants or legislators or industrialists or ethicists can't do what's needed, and early enough: only other scientists can. Science is the last of the great medieval guilds, meaning that its natural institutional controls are of a kind that most people in this century have never experienced.
>
> Medicine and the law are professions that in theory retain a self-governing, collegiate, guild organization; the patchy ethical performance of lawyers and doctors, and the sluggishness of discipline in these professions make the idea of peer controls and self-government seem dubious. But medicine and law have abondoned, since the turn of the century or before, the essential organizational device of the guild: the apprentice system. Science retains that. The scientific community is the last place

*Fearful of Science," Harper's Magazine, June, 1975.

> where every student must work at the bench in direct, individual relation to his master. It is almost the last place where the apprentice, once he has qualified, must spend an itinerant, journeyman period for several years, doing his work in other men's lab's, before setting up for himself. The mark of setting up for himself is that he acquires apprentices of his own. The apprentice system is the fundamental reason why there is something that can sensibly be called the scientific community. I don't want to press the point too far; the system has certainly been strained by the doubling and redoubling in the past twenty years of the number of students who want to be scientists. Yet it is at the bench, from the man who supervises a young scientist's first research, that he takes the attitudes that will inform his ethical approach to doing science. (p. 76)

Judson speaks of "the scientific community" as the proper focus for mechanism of self-restraint, contrary to the conventional view of the relationship of the humanities to the sciences. Peter Buck* argues that such references to "the community of scientists" are often casual and uncritical.

> Both in the immediate post-war debates over atomic weapons and in the current controversy about recombinant DNA, questions about the autonomy of this aggregate have evoked passionate responses from scientists. In part this reaction is due to the symbolic value attached to the concept of community. It is, for example, difficult to visualize arguments about the autonomy of scientific unions having quite the same purchase on our political attention, or to believe that our commitments would be quite so vigorous if we saw the institutions of American science as Max Weber did. In the "external conditions" of science in the United States at the time of World War I, Weber found a distinctively "American system." The emergence of "large, capitalist, university enterprises," indistinguishable from other "state capitalist" organizations, had produced "the same condition that is found wherever capitalist enterprise comes into operation: the 'separation of the worker from his means of production.'" Far from being autonomous, the American scientists described by Weber were wholly "dependent upon the implements" put at their disposal by their employers, a development which corresponded "entirely to what happened to the artisan of the past."**

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* "Images of the Scientific 'Community': Commentary on Papers by Alice Kimball Smith and Dorothy Nelkin," Newsletter on Science, Technology and Human Values, June 1978, #4, Cambridge, MA.

** Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 131.

> This characterization of American Science and its institutions is, of course, political and tendentious, but so, too are accounts built around images of scientific communities. To juxtapose the two is to see a striking paradox, the dimensions of which may be grasped by reflecting on the ease with which sociologists were able once to distinguish between traditional and modern forms of social organization by drawing sharp contrasts between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, community and society. To speak of scientific communities is, in effect, to try to describe that most modern of intellectual enterprises in terms of categories devised to characterize the most traditional social relationships. Therefore, it should not be surprising that "crises of confidence" now envelop the politics of science.

For Buck, accounts of American science which rely on the image of scientific communities are as tendentious as those which construe scientific work taking form as a result of the handing-in of implements to scientists by their employers, as though scientists were unionized laborers. He concludes:

> Our image of the community of science simultaneously reinforces our inclination to set the history of science apart from the course of history generally, leads us to see stark oppositions between scientific ideals and the realities of scientific practice, and finally, encourages the dream that a proper union of science with public policy may reinvigorate the pre-modern and anti-industrial values, symbols, and social forms identified with a lost sense of community. This is an extravagant expectation, but it is recognizably American it its antihistorical promise of both an escape from history and a regeneration of it. (p. 47)

Illustrating yet a different source of program ideas, Rene DuBos wrote that biology has lost contact with the humanities.

> Indeed, it is commonly stated that biology has lost contact with the humanities because it has become too "scientific" and as a consequence no longer deals with the problems peculiar to the humaneness of man. There is no doubt, of course, about the loss of contact, but the explanation of the difficulty in my judgement is that biology is not scientific enough.
>
> By neglecting the study of a large variety of man's responses, biology is betraying one of the responsibilities of science -- namely, the development of objective methods for describing all aspects of reality. Today, as in the past, the most compelling and interesting problems of human life

> come from the manner in which man reacts passively, and responds creatively, to the challenges of his total environment. Biology will once more become a complementary aspect of the humanities if it accepts the urgent social task to provide knowledge of the raw materials of experience out of which man creates himself.*

The by-now famous work of sociobiologists such as E. O. Wilson is in some measure a response to DuBos' plea. Recently Wilson wrote that not only does sociobiology represent us with the means for rejoining biology to the humanities, it suggests the power of scientific naturalism to "alter the foundations of their [social scientists and humanistic scholars] systematic inquiry by redefining the mental process itself." Wilson, rarely shy, extrapolates from the evidence of biology to all other fields and suggests a modification of scientific humanism which is in turn suggestive for program purposes:

> through the recognition that the mental processes of religious belief--consecration of personal and group identity, attention to charismatic leaders, mythopoeism, the others--represent programmed predispositions whose self-sufficient components were incorporated into the neural apparatus of the brain by thousands of generations of genetic evolution. . .Man's destiny is to know, if only because societies with knowledge culturally dominate societies that lack it. Luddites and anti-intellectuals do not master the differential equations of thermodynamics or the biochemical cures of illness. They stay in thatched huts and die young. Cultures with unifying goals will learn more rapidly than those that lack them, and an autocatalytic growth of learning will follow because scientific materialism is the only mythology that can manufacture great goals from the sustained pursuit of pure knowledge.**

As if challenging Wilson's optimism by anticipation, George Steiner wrote in 1961 of the vulnerability of the very idea of literacy brought about changes in culture surely linked to the advent of science. "The primacy of the word, of that which can be spoken and communicated in discourse, ..." has diminished. To a considerable extent, this is justified:

> those of us who are compelled by our ignorance of exact science to imagine the universe through a veil of non-mathematical language inhabit an animate fiction. The actual facts of the case --the space-time continuum of relativity, the atomic structure of all matter, the wave-particle state of energy--are no longer accessible through the word. It is no paradox to assert that in

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* "Humanistic Biology," The American Scholar, Spring, 1965, p. 198.

** "Hope," On Human Nature, Harvard 1978, p. 206-207.

cardinal respects reality now begins *outside* verbal language.*

But in the widespread acceptance of the technical supremacy of the languages of mathematics as being in fact a general supremacy, in an atmosphere of emphasis on the positive and exact,

> many of the traditional humanistic disciplines have shown a deep *malaise*, a nervous complex recognition of the exactions and triumphs of mathematics and the natural sciences. There has taken place in history, economics, and what are called, significantly, the "social sciences" what one might term a fallacy of imitative form. In each of these fields, the mode of discourse still relies almost completely on word-language. But historians, economists, and social scientists have tried to graft on to the verbal matrix some of the proceedings of mathematics or total rigor. They have grown defensive about the essentially provisional and aesthetic character of their own pursuits.**

The turn of events Steiner describes suggests not only possibilities for projects, but problems to resolve regarding, e.g., implementing policies for defining "humanists." One of Steiner's warnings might be taken as a point of departure in discussions on such matters: he speaks of "illicit metaphors, terms borrowed though misunderstood:"

> It is arrogant, if not irresponsible, to invoke such basic notions in our present model of the universe as quanta, the indeterminacy principle, the relativity constant, or the lack of parity in so-called weak interaction of atomic particles, if one cannot do so in the language appropriate to them--that is to say, in mathematical terms. Without it, such words are phantasms to deck out the pretense of philosophers or journalists.***

In a footnote added later, he allows that "The vulgarizations, false analogies, even errors of the poet and critic may be a necessary part of the 'translation' of science into the common literacy of feeling." In this case, the illicit metaphor ". . .may be an essential part of a process reunification."****

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* "The Retreat from the Word," Language and Silence. Atheneum, New York, 1967, p. 17.

** "The Retreat from the Word," Language and Silence, Atheneum, New York, 1967, p. 18.

*** op. cit., p. 15-16.

**** op. cit., p. 16.

Gerald Holton might, on the basis of his work in "thematic analysis"* of scientific research, maintain that the situation is not so desperate. The uncovering of scientists' basic commitment to elements that function as enduring themes, according to which their work is organized and motivated, could reveal basic commonalities between science and humanistic concerns. Einstein's well-known saying, "God does not play dice with the universe," uttered by way of opposition to the quantum theory of matter, illustrates such a theme. Einstein resolutely refused to accept the quantum-theoretical formulation as a final description of nature's workings, though he admitted it was "the most successful physical theory of our time." Oppositions like this one between themes present in scientific research are neither easily resolved nor readily explained. Their resemblance to ideological disputes in politics might not be accidental; exploration of this possibility, revealing once again commonalities in science and the humanities, could be a fruitful line of program development.

Finally, we might attend to the issues arising in connection with the advent of Big Science. Eugene Wigner, a Nobel Laureate in physics, has written:** "Evidently, the whole character and mode of operation of science will change if it becomes a significant endeavor of the community and if it claims a large fraction of the total effort of mankind. Gone will be the days when the leaders of science could pursue their work playfully and with levity. The responsibility of scientific leaders will be quite similar to the present responsibility of leading members of the Administration or of the directors of large companies."

Wigner's description of the opposite end of the spectrum is an appropriate way to end this review: "science can be pursued by a large fraction of all people, not as a national effort, but playfully, each for his own amusement...if the leaders of all nations could somehow reconcile their desire for influence and domination with the true welfare of their subjects, science could become its own purpose by bringing satisfaction to many disciples. It would then play a role in human affairs somewhat similar to that of sports but much more powerful and intense. Arts and poetry, and perhaps some other avocations, can perhaps also play a similar role, and it would be desirable to devote more thought to them as sources of general human satisfaction."

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* "The Humanistic Basis of Scientific Work," Change Magazine, Summer, 1975.

** Symmetries and Reflections. Indiana University Press,1967 (pp 275 - 276).

THE HUMANITIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

by

Michael Sherman with John Harbeson

In October 1978 the Wisconsin Humanities Committee staff reviewed the draft of a proposal for a program on "Global Interdependence: Creative Approaches to a Changing World Order." The staff was concerned about a few points in the proposal, the most important of which was a lack of obvious humanities contributions to the topic. The Associate Director writes most of the draft review letters for the WHC, and in this case I included the following paragraph in my comments to the project director.

"... there is some need to refine your description and presentation of this program as a humanities project. Some of your personnel do, indeed, qualify as humanists, but many of the people included in the roster of speakers are more strictly speaking social scientists than humanists. The Committee has no prejudice against social scientists or the social sciences, and it is often the case that representatives of disciplines outside the humanities appear on WHC-funded programs. The problem is, rather, to define for yourselves and for us what makes your program a humanities program. In what way can you demonstrate that the emphasis of the lectures and discussion is on some aspect of the humanities? How will your program promote a broader and deeper appreciation of the humanities among the members of your audience? How does your program demonstrate the use of the humanities in the discussion of public policy issues? The draft you have submitted leaves most of these questions only partially answered at best, and I must inform you that the Committee will look very closely at this point and demand better answers than you have provided."

My letter to the project director was passed on to Mr. John Harbeson, Chairperson of the Division of Social Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, who had served as a consultant to the group preparing the proposal on Global Interdependence. Mr. Harbeson's

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MICHAEL SHERMAN is the Associate Director of the Wisconsin Humanities Committee; JOHN HARBESON is the Chairperson of the Division of Social Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Parkside.
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response to my letter opened the correspondence between us which appears below, in edited form.

October 24, 1978

*Dear Ms. Anderson:**

I have had the opportunity to read Mr. Sherman's letter of October 9 concerning the proposal to fund a Global Interdependence Program at the Univereity of Wisconsin-Parkside in the Spring of 1979. His letter raises questions concerning [among other things] the humanistic credentials of the speakers and panelists...

I am particularly concerned about Mr. Sherman's doubts regarding the humanistic credentials of the program participants. Implicitly he appears to have adopted a definition of humanism that is more restrictive than that of the National Endowment whose guidelines I trust and hope the Wisconsin Humanities Council follows. My understanding of the working definition is that it follow methodological rather than disciplinary lines; including philosophical, literary, and historical examination but excluding applications of the scientific and normally quantitative methodology characteristic of the physical and biological sciences. It has always been the case that whole legions of those who study society's problems have relied heavily if not exclusively on humanistic rather than scientific methodology, the appellation "social sciences" that lumps us all together notwithstanding. Indeed, as a review of our books and journals would indicate, this is increasingly the case and nowhere more so than among those who deal with the kinds of problems upon which the Global Interdependence program is to focus. From another perspective, it is difficult to imagine competent examination of these particular problems without engaging the skills primarily of those engaged in the study of society, drawing from among those who work in the languages and philosophy. Finally, I assure you that each of the individuals included on this program fits within the working definition of a humanist. We hoped that this could be discerned in the curricula vitae that have been included with the application, but the program sponsors will be happy to answer any specific questions you may have in this regard...

Yours sincerely,

John W. Harbeson, Chairperson

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* Patricia Anderson is the Executive Director of the Wisconsin Humanities Committee.

October 30, 1978

Dear Professor Harbeson:

Your letter of October 24 has been given to me to answer. As you were distressed by comments in my letter of October 9 and challenged some of my statements, I think it is appropriate that I reply...

Your letter contains an objection to what you take to be my very narrow view (even narrower than that of the National Endowment for the Humanities) of what the humanities are...

The point I was attempting to make in my letter is that while the Committee is willing to be quite liberal in its notions of humanistic expertise, it wants reasonable assurances from project directors that personnel on the program will be acting as humanists. I assure you that I know quite well that a political scientist can be a humanist, that a lawyer can be learned in jurisprudence, and that an anthropologist can eschew the kind of quantitative and scientific methods of research and analysis that we normally associate with social scientific inquiry. I believe, however, that where it is appropriate, political scientists, lawyers, and anthropologists have an obligation to demonstrate to a Humanities Committee that they will be speaking as humanists when they participate in our programs. The NEH acknowledges that the social sciences, when they address questions of humanistic concern, are acceptable under their grant guidelines. The WHC has gone even further by not insisting on a roster of personnel drawn exclusively from the humanities. But we do want to know what we are getting in these programs, and we do want to be sure that the main thrust of a program produced with our money will be toward a demonstration of how the humanities may be used for the discussion of public policy issues...

Yours sincerely,

Michael Sherman, Associate Director

November 8, 1978

Dear Mr. Sherman:

Thank you for your letter of October 30 responding in detail to the points in my earlier letter. I do appreciate your response to my concerns and WHC's process of getting some of these issues aired before decisions are taken. However, I must say that I continue to be very concerned about the kinds of evidence that

you and the reviewing committee may employ to determine who qualifies as a humanist. If the curriculum vitae and the topics to be addressed do not indicate the approach and concerns of the participants, then I very much think that WHC should formulate and require of applicants materials that it considers will answer this question beyond reasonable doubt. What is there that suggests non-humanistic orientations beyond the professional labels of the participants, which we agree does not by itself answer any questions? What additional kinds of evidence would be required to allay WHC concerns and which ought to be requested from all applicants? If applicants from certain disciplines must overcome a higher burden of proof, the kinds of proof required should be indicated...

Once again, thank you for your response to my concerns.

Yours sincerely,

J.W.H.

November 9, 1978

Dear Mr. Harbeson:

As our rhetorical guns have been, to quote Andrew Jackson, "raised a little lower," I would like to respond in friendly terms to your letter of November 7, especially to the dilemma of how to tell a humanist from a social scientist.

I readily admit that confusion and frustration are rampant on this point... Both the humanities and the social sciences can, and often do, address the question of the place of the individual in society or try to assess the way values are formulated and expressed in the context of society. When these questions are at issue I think there is no real problem for the WHC.

The crucial point is trying to understand how the study of individuals in society is going to proceed. My own sense of the difference between the humanities and social sciences is that the former try always to look at individuals as autonomous, creative, imaginative beings, whereas the social sciences try to formulate the laws of society of human behavior which describe or even circumscribe "typical" action. It is a matter of emphasizing the action of individuals or the ways people are acted upon; internal as opposed to external phenomena; the emotive response to the world as opposed to the more mechanical model and reactive response.

My sense of what goes on in WHC meetings, is that some such thinking guides the Committee members as they look at proposals. The prejudice is therefore not for or against an approach to thinking

about a problem. It is not even a prejudice, I think (because all of the people who serve on the WHC realize the necessity of having a pluralistic world of knowledge), rather, it is a conscientious attempt to follow the mandate of the NEH. If we are to be known as a Humanities Committee, then we must try to promote those discussions and ways of knowing or dissecting a problem which reflect whatever it is we can understand by the term, humanities.

There are, as you point out, bound to be gray areas where good and bad definitions of the humanities alike will break down. I think the Committee is inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant in these cases, but they do insist -- and I think rightly so -- that the applicant try to make the case for his or her program as a humanistic one strongly and seriously.

In the program which prompted this debate, our reading of the first draft led us to conclude that the case for calling it a humanities program had not been made strongly enough and that the personnel chosen to participate had not been presented in strong enough terms as humanists or as people who were likely to approach the problem under discussion as humanists. I never said, and I never meant to say or even imply, that the issue itself could not be discussed from a humanistic point of view. Nor did I mean to say that people whose credentials displayed disciplines normally associated with the social sciences could not possibly be considered as humanists. In my letter to the project directors I asked only that some more convincing attempt be made to say why the program they proposed should be considered a humanities program, to be supported by a Humanities Committee.

I think we are closer to each other's point of view than appeared in our first exchange. Most of all, I think we are both aware of the difficulties and the delicacy involved in refining a definition for the humanities. I, for one, continue to wrestle with this problem, because I encounter it constantly in my work. I suppose that you do as well.

I have enjoyed this exchange. I hope we can meet some day and continue it in person. I will be glad to continue it on paper if you wish.

Yours sincerely,

M.S.

November 17, 1978

Dear Mr. Sherman:

I thank you for your letter of November 9. It provides me with fresh insight into your thinking and, I would gather, that of the Committee as a whole. But your letter causes me to want to press my original questions with renewed interest.

Your proposed definition of a humanist is the first official one that I have seen and one which is very troubling. Though you recognize the shades of gray, your definition of a humanist as one who studies "individuals as autonomous, creative, imaginative beings" in contrast to social scientists who "try to formulate laws of society or human behavior" is too stereotypical and restrictive to be fair. In the first place, a large number of philosophers would be excluded from the category "humanist" by your definition as would some social scientists. But I wonder if philosophers are generally assumed to be humanists where social scientists are not and whether in terms of your own definition that would be fair. Second, your description of social sciences is far too narrow to fit the facts concerning those who are generally lumped under that name. Not all social scientists even aspire to fit your definition, a great number of anthropologists for example, and the implication that those who are interested in general processes proceed to that goal by ignoring the expressions of individuals wars with reality. Perhaps the basic problem is that your definition suggests that if social scientists are interested in more than one individual at a point in time or in the wider implications of specific individual expressions, they ipso facto lose track of the individual and aren't humanists. This points to the third difficulty with the definition which is that apparently it suggests that in studying social problems, which WHC does not wish to discourage, the only valid route is to study what some individual has said about them. If one addresses the issues themselves and their many implications, such behavior would appear not to be humanistic by your definition because it ignores the individual in a concern with society. In short, I think your definition proposes an unworkable dichotomy between concern with the individual and concern with society.

The basic problems I initially posed, therefore, clearly are very real. The working definition of humanism is not stated with sufficient clarity in the application procedures for applicants to know what it is they have to show. When, through colloquy, a working definition begins to emerge, it becomes apparent that social scientists have to overcome a burden of proof that others don't, which is unfair because it is based on an unrealistic, overgeneralized conception of what social scientists do.

It seems to me that a humanist is one who addresses the moral, ethical, political, or social dimension and problems of the human condition through analysis of literary expressions, philosophic statements, social policy questions and issues, and cultural traits and values of particular peoples. This definition would exclude the quantifiers in the social sciences, the hypothesis testers in scientific laboratories, the content analyzers in the literature field, and some of the purely semantic analysis of philosophers and linguists. It would exclude historians who are simply fact gatherers. I don't propose to say that this is a perfect definition but I think it is a lot more descriptive of the species, less constricted but perhaps more demanding than yours.

I continue to think that in the interests of fairness and realism, the working WHC definition of "humanist" may need refining and, certainly, clearer specification for those applying for WHC grants...

I, too, have found this correspondence valuable. It has never been unfriendly as far as I am concerned. From my point of view it has stemmed from real concerns which have not yet been set to rest. I would be fascinated to see what the WHC reviewing committee would say if it were to review our correspondence. If you think it appropriate, feel free to bring my letters as well as your own to the attention of the committee. I, too, would welcome the opportunity to discuss these things in person. I hope we are furthering the cause of humanism just a little by our very correspondence.

Yours sincerely,

J.W.H.

December 6, 1978

Dear Mr. Harbeson:

Thank you for your letter of November 17. As I read it, and as I re-read it now, I am reminded of the James Thurber cartoon, "Touchee." I don't believe you have decapitated my argument about the humanities, but I admit that you have found the weaknesses in it as I presented it in my letter and probed them very deeply.

The argument in my previous letter was not cogent because it was incomplete...

In what may appear to you as a bit of immodesty, I am enclosing a piece I wrote for a WHC conference ("The Views from Montaigne's Tower," Federation Reports 2:3 [November, 1978], pp. 21-28.) In the talk I outline far more completely what I understand by humanistic inquiry. I think the argument answers better to your objections than I have done in our exchanges so far.

[With Mr. Harbeson's permission and encouragement, I here summarize the argument of my paper:

"The life and work of Michel de Montaigne suggest three important models for modern humanism. First is the rhythm of action and contemplation -- involving oneself in the world one inhabits, then retreating from it to contemplate the lessons about human nature and one's own individual life that are learned through the comparison of our experiences with those of others as we can glean them from books.

"Second, humanism is a kind of knowledge based on the assumption of the intellecutal autonomy of human beings and the significance of creative individuality. The humanist works by employing some analytical techniques, called in antiquity 'the good arts.' These are the arts of language -- that is, a consistent mode of communication, containing both rules and vocabulary -- the analysis of ideas; aesthetic analysis; and historical analysis. These four techniques for understanding texts -- and by text I mean a work of prose or poetry, a painting, a symphony, even a dance or a ritual ceremony -- reflect the theoretical assumptions which lie behind their choice and use as typically humanistic techniques. The techniques delineated by the good arts have been adopted to suit the goal of examining and paying honor to human individualism and creativity. Implicit in the study made possible by the good arts is the conviction that the made object, the fashioned idea, the conceptualized world view, in short, the creative work of human beings, is their most liberating work, the sign of freedom from mere physical necessity. In contrast with the natural or social sciences, which look for the laws governing sensible phenomena, humanists look for the signs of at least intellectual and spiritual if not necessarily social or physical autonomy.

"Third and finally, one of the important end products of humanistic study is humanitarianism -- a tolerant and sympathetic attitude toward our fellow human beings. The humanities thus have the potential to make us participants in as well as observers of human accomplishments and human frailties. They can make us see, through careful study, the elements of life, thought, and expression which bind us to each other."]

As for your discussion of the social sciences, I am now puzzled by your description of them. It is certainly true that not all philosophers are properly called humanists by my definition, and not all historians are humanists either (but then, not all historians have aspired to that title). I still maintain, however, that a social scientist properly so-called is mainly concerned about the aggregate or at least summative view of human beings

in society. The use of individual experiences by the social scientist is, as I understand it, in the form of a case study. But the case study, the individual solution to an ethical, political, or social problem, is there to be used as a clue to the discovery of a model for a much larger whole. In short, I see the social sciences as feeding into a larger model of society or human nature the case studies they have chosen. The social sciences, I believe, are far more normative in their assumptions and procedures than the humanities.

By contrast, the study of language and literature, moral philosophy, history, and aesthetics by a humanist is guided, I am convinced, by precisely those notions of individual autonomy and creativity which I have already discussed. The individual and his or her work can and often do stand alone or complete as objects of contemplation, individual assessment, and comparison with the audience's own experiences, thoughts, and judgements. I continue to believe that the humanistic mode of study tries to isolate and describe the individual experiences or perceptions of men and women in society. It sees works of philosophy, literature, history, or political thought as the personal distillation of the creator's experiences. Where the humanist goes further -- as in the case of historians -- it is with the intent of checking the results of the study of ideas or works against a larger framework composed of events, or more typically, of other expressions of reality.

I accept your argument that we exclude from the humanities "quantifiers... content analyzers... some of the purely semantic analyses of philosophers and linguists... (and) historians who are simply fact gatherers." But I disagree that we can assume that many anthropologists are humanists by definition, or that many social scientists are "closet" humanists. If that were the case, the distinction between the humanities and the social sciences would be philosophically as well as administratively absurd.

On other matters in your letter, I agree that the Committee probably puts an unfair burden on social scientists to prove that they are going to talk like humanists, and that there is a built-in assumption with WHC members that anyone whose academic discipline falls administratively into the humanities is entitled to the Committee's imprimatur. We have, however, intentionally designed the personnel forms for our grant applications to allow those whose disciplines may not appear on the "NEH approved list" to speak to their qualifications and to make sure that those listed as humanists are really going to think and talk that way. What more can a humanities committee do to fulfill its charge to make the humanities accessible to the community of out-of-school adults?...

Yours sincerely,

M.S.

January 17, 1979

Dear Michael:

Thank you for your letter of December 6. While our concerns regarding the particular proposal in question no doubt still remain, I am very happy that our colloquy has broadened to focus on some underlying and more fundamental questions. Since we have agreed that this letter is to conclude our exchange on this particular matter, I would like to attempt to identify some strands of thought that may be bases for bringing our respective conceptions of the humanities in their relationship to the social sciences.

We appear to have arrived at agreement on some of the forms of scholarship that are very definitely not of a humanistic nature and to have mutually recognized that not all those that find university homes in disciplines classified as the humanities are, in fact, necessarily humanistic. The question remains, however, whether and on what terms scholars institutionally categorized as social scientists ever differentiate themselves sufficiently from scholarship that we agree is not humanistic and approach methods of inquiry that we could both agree merit the humanistic designation. Moreover, in re-reading our correspondence I note that you agreed in your letter of November 9 that both the humanities and social scientists "can and often do address the question of the place of the individual in society or try to assess the way values are formulated and expressed in the context of society." But we are still grappling with the senses in which, as you suggest, the social sciences are absorbed with individual experiences in order to arrive at an "aggregate or summative view of human beings in society" while the humanities focus on the creativity of autonomous individuals and deal with society as a whole "with the intent of checking the results of the study of ideas or works." We are still at work on the question, thus, of whether we can formulate a useful distinction between the humanities and the social sciences in this way.

Your paper on "The Views from Montaigne's Tower" interested me greatly and did very much help me to understand the bases of your views of the humanities. In reading it I was struck, in ways that I would like to try to articulate, both by senses in which even those of us not inescapably wedded to applications of scientific method to the study of politics still are not humanists and by some very basic ways in which the social sciences and the humanities are very much united in methods and purposes. First, there is the humanist as a person of contemplation but also of active concern with questions of public policy that swirl about him or her, and WHC's and NEH's concern that involvement with these questions not detract from service to "more universal

interests." All the social sciences make the transition back and forth between concerns of a more practical nature and issues and subjects of a more theoretical or universal nature. This applies both to those who are and those who are not completely committed to the applications of scientific method in the study of society. In the vast number of subjects that Montaigne's Essays explore are many that more eclectic social scientists would recognize as having an important bearing on their central concerns. Many social scientists are not wedded to scientific methods because they recognize that the human mind's capability to perceive and the facets of society to be perceived are far more encompassing and of greater depth than such methodology permits us to accept. In this sense, I think many social scientists would be most comfortable in Montaigne's library and fascinated with the man himself. They wish to study and influence societies yet also to retreat in reflection upon them directly and through reading. Social scientists can and do recognize and bear witness to the validity of stepping outside events, as it were, to reflect as an individual upon them as creatively as possible. However, I think it is probably also the case that such social scientists would, while honoring such activity for its own sake, also want to test the products of such labors as rigorously as possible against "reality" even though not committeed to scientific methods in doing so. I've a feeling that might irritate Montaigne a little, his own rich experiences in political life notwithstanding.

Second, there is the humanists' absorption with what you have called the "good arts." Humanists see in manifestations of such arts confirmation of individuals' spiritual and intellectual autonomy and freedom from sheer physical necessity. But you want to contrast social sciences, as those concerned with "laws governing sensible phenomena." Here, I think, is the heart of the issue between us. Of course, many social scientists wish to be able to explain social phenomena and even build comprehensive models of society. The acts of formulating such explanations and proposing such models are themselves clearly exemplifications of "the good arts" and such exertions are likewise clearly celebrated as acts of free, creative minds exemplifying the highest capabilities of human beings. But, the explanations and models -- better terms than "laws" I think -- simply do not even aspire to conceptualize human beings as an undifferentiated mass. Those who view Marx, for example, as most guilty of such generalization fail to read on and discover that he deplores the extent to which such a "mass" has emerged and that he seeks equality, not lack of differentiation. The very significant minority of social scientists who do not want to be bound to the use of only scientific methodology claim ironically enough to be more empirical than their more singleminded scientific co-workers. Relativism in philosophy has so permeated the social sciences that our model building and explaining involves comparing individuals, groups, and societies

to such an extent that focus on understanding differences in beliefs and norms as well as behavior outstrips emphasis on global similarities. That is why the term "laws" misrepresents us, for it carries an assumption of blindness to differences that simply is not characteristic. While fields within the social sciences, like anthropology, serve to counteract any contrary tendency. Against that background of recognition of the idiosyncratic, we do try to generalize, but Montaigne did as well and, likewise, latter day humanists.

The differences between humanities and social scientists, of the stripe that I am representing to you, lie, therefore, I think not in acceptance of individual, creative and furtherance of the good arts, in which both social scientists and humanists engage, nor in ignoring idiosyncracy in seeking to understand societies and the issues that confront them, for humanists as well as social scientists explore general world views on such matters. The difference, I suspect, is more one of means and ends. Social scientists, I suspect, value exercises in the "good arts" not only for their own sake but for their usefulness in understanding society, even if we do not try to test them in any scientific manner. Humanists, I suspect, may be more inclined to content themselves with such exhibits of the "fashioned idea" or the "conceptualized world view" without taking the additional step social scientists do.

Underlying much of my concern with these issues is the belief that social scientists and humanists need each other. Social scientists may not relate closely to practitioners of aesthetic analysis or humanists to macro-economic theory. But philosophers, students of literature and drama, political theorists and philosophers, historians, students of comparative social and cultural analysis, and others seem to me to share many of the same concerns, methodologies, world views, and values even if they are not synonymous. "Social scientists" within this group ought to be able to generate some insights to stimulate the imagination of the humanists in this circle. And it is certainly the case that those who do not rely solely on scientific methods in social science derive much of their inspiration from the formulations of humanists.

Lastly, humanitarianism is surely something upon which social scientists and humanists can place equal weight. It is over the importance of a humane approach to understanding society that those who do and do not think it appropriate to rely soley upon scientific methods differ. We reject the view that complete detachment, impersonalized and "dehumanized" is possible, desirable, or always even productive. We want social science to fortify rather than ignore or implicitly detract from a "sympathetic attitude toward human beings." Where the problem comes is that in adopting such

a perspective we cannot always be engaged in emphasizing the things that "bind us to each other." To be humanitarian in politics is often to be partisan, and to be concerned with replacing the edifices of those who seem not to place humanity first among their priorities. But the real object even here is to replace edifices which seem to subordinate humanitarian concerns with ones that honor our common humanity.

In short, I am suggesting that social scientists' affiliation with the humanities is real if not uncomplicated. Our correspondence has brought home to me in a personal sense this very point that I have been professing.

Yours sincerely,

John

PART IV STATE HUMANITIES PROGRAMS AND MEDIA

Using Media Effectively in State Humanities Programs — William Brennan — 85

William Brennan examines how state programs can use media effectively in terms of quantity (multiple use or audience size), humanities content (substantial humanities content vs. providing a common experience upon which humanities activity can be based) and quality (standards that are too lax). He recommends using the Federation as a vehicle for national movement toward shared information and collaborative action.

Communicating the Humanties Through Mass Media — Marvin Vawter — 93

Marvin Vawter seeks to establish guidelines by which state councils can decide to fund a media project. Because media programs should aim for "re-experience or new experience per se" and provide a powerful link between emotion and intellect, he suggests that "we should use media when concepts and perceptions of human individuality and human universality can not be captured in any other way . . . [when] one can't easily formulate intellectually analyzed answers to these questions."

Creativity and the Jargon of Trust — Mark Rozeen — 97

"Have the state humanities councils, in an attempt to protect ourselves from funding bad media projects, effectively choked off good media projects? In an effort to stimulate creativity, have we celebrated mediocrity?" Mark Rozeen urges us to develop our gambling instincts and trust those professionals to whom grants are made and outlines actions which could develop such attitudes.

USING MEDIA EFFECTIVELY IN STATE HUMANITIES PROGRAMS

by

William Brennan

"The committee should typically fund projects which provide ample opportunity for dialogue among all of the participants. Committees may wish to experiment occasionally with media or other formats which do not always involve dialogue."
NEH State-Based Program: Principles and Standards

It is not easy to say something helpful about using media effectively in state humanities programs, so many perplexities surround the topic. And yet, it seems important to try. We know that media do reach the public (by "media" I mean radio, television and film). We think that media are in some sense capable of communicating the humanities, although this is seriously, and correctly, questioned. The disciplined striving to understand the meaning of our lives and the value of our actions, normally undertaken in dialogue with others likewise engaged, is seldom to be found on radio, television or film. From the point of view of the audience, the essential conditions of sustained attention are normally absent. From the point of view of the writer, the air-time clock is racing, and there is no time to reflect upon, to weigh, to examine, what is being presented. From the point of view of the broadcaster, numbers count: mass appeal translates into lowest common denominator. The use of media in public humanities programs was very properly considered an "experiment," and should be considered so now, and in the future. But, what an exciting experiment!

In this essay I am not going to concentrate upon those perplexities surrounding the use of media that are most familiar to us all. These concern the processes that are necessary on the part of a state program if it is to invest its media funds wisely: the special demands of proposal review and project monitoring in an attempt to insure both quality and substantial humanities content; special problems of using media materials beyond the occasion for which they were originally produced.

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Such problems have led states to establish media centers and other processes and devices which, I believe, will be explained elsewhere.

My concerns are two-fold: what is possible and desirable? And, who should be doing what?

It is possible and desirable to produce and make effective use of media material with substantial humanities content, but this presupposes at least a generalized consensus on the meaning of the expression "humanities content" that I have yet to find. I think that we can by-pass the cul-de-sac of attempting to agree on the proper definition by settling for one that I think will be useful for the task at hand. More about this later. It is also possible and desirable to produce and make effective use of media material which, while it does not possess substantial humanities content, does provide a common experience upon which humanities activity may be based. Such material may be primarily poetic or dramatic, in which case it provides both information and a context of feeling, or it may be primarily journalistic, in which case it provides necessary data.

It is possible, but not desirable, to produce both kinds of media material without making effective use of the material. Rather than trying to define what constitutes "effective use" in every case, let us think in terms of a continuum from "least effective" to "most effective." Assuming for the sake of argument that the quality of use is largely fixed by the quality of the production, then the measure of effectiveness becomes largely one of quantity: how often is the material used? how many projects and how many people does it serve? We may say that the least effective use is no use at all; e.g., the conference that is videotaped without any provision for being shown. The next least effective use is single use, i.e., the media material is used on a single project only. More effective use would involve the media material in a number of different projects within the state over a period of time. State media centers seek to provide this kind of multiple usage, even to the extent of designing programs around the media materials that have been generated and making such "packaged" programs available to their constituency. In addition to involving a major commitment of administrative funds, media center activity are frustrated by the design and quality of the materials. Naturally, the individual project director producing media for his or her project is not concerned with a design that will render the product usable in many contexts beyond his own. Instant obsolescence is often unnecessarily programmed into the material. Furthermore, single-use media budgets are constrained. The producer often must settle for lower quality than is desirable -- minimum acceptable standards. Whereas, production for multiple use from the outset could justify a level of quality that would make the material attractive to other users and worth the time and effort involved in storage, publicizing and distribution. Most effective use would involve use

nationwide over a long period of time. This presupposes a national system of distribution about which more will be said below.

To the best of my knowledge no state is presently requiring that all or most of its media production be designed for multiple use beyond the boundaries of the single project for which funds are provided. Although the context in which public humanities programs take place is remarkably varied, the subjects addressed and the kinds of exploration involved are repetitive: education, family life, aging, social justice, conservation, etc. The humanities' impulse to explore the relatively few underlying principles that are considered desirable in individual, family and societal life, provide a rich opportunity for the gradual accumulation of media materials that can be used effectively over and over again.

Finally, it is possible, but not desirable, to produce both kinds of media material when an adequate, and quite possibly superior program, already exists. It is far cheaper to purchase, or to rent, than it is to produce. But this option assumes what does not presently exist: an easy means for finding out not only the existence of certain kinds of media material and its availability, but also its quality and appropriateness for a given situation. The success of some states in packaging programs for their constituency based upon Civilisation, The Ascent of Man, The American Short Story and other media materials, suggests a most promising line of development for the future.

Let me now return to the distinction made above between media materials with substantial humanities content and those which, while not possessing substantial humanities content, do provide a common experience upon which humanities activity may be based. This is an important, if perilous, distinction. It is important because it defines two very different kinds of use: materials with substantial humanities content are suitable for broadcast or presentation on their own, without the need for a supplementary humanities context. Materials without substantial humanities content are only useful for us as audio-visual aids to a process in which participants engage in humanities activity. It is important, secondly, because media materials with substantial humanities content are by far less expensive to produce, and correlatively, by far the most attractive option for individual state support. It is important, finally, and this is where I begin to get into trouble, because in my judgment we are producing almost nothing by way of media materials with substantial humanities content. Rather, we are producing audiovisual aids, and using them independently, as if they had substantial humanities content. Now you can see why the distinction is perilous.

To make myself clear, let me cite an example that I think you will accept. I attend a performance of Hamlet. The next day, in class, I discuss the play with others who have seen it. We are trying to understand as deeply as we can, first, its meaning, and second, its value. I hope that I am correct in supposing that you would agree: the substantial humanities content is in the discussion, not in the experience of the perfromance. If not, I do not see how we can claim an adequate distinction between the humanities and the arts. Now, suppose that I attended, not a play, but a film of the play Hamlet. Next day in class I discuss the film-play, seeking again to understand its meaning and value. Once again, I hope you will agree, the substantial humanities content is in the discussion, not in the film. In our careless way (how human) we tend to tell people that, for example, literature is a humanities discipline. From this point it is an easy step to conclude that literature has humanities content. But, while literature is certainly profoundly humanistic, it is not the content or form of literature that is humanities. Rather, as the congressional legislation correctly states, it is the study of literature. I conclude that it is not the presentation of literature, or of art, or of other documents of human life and culture, but rather disciplined and careful (I am tempted to say philosophical) grappling with the meaning and value of literature and life, that constitutes substantial humanities content. If my argument is correct, the broadcast of such NEH productions as The Scarlet Letter or The American Short Story series is not, in itself, presentation of the humanities. The same argument applies to many state-supported media presentations which, while artful and humanistic, do not embody substantial humanities content. The argument also applies to many state-supported media presentations that are essentially journalistic, in the style of Bill Moyers' Journal, that present all sides of an issue, but not a disciplined inquiry into their meaning or value.

At this point you might reasonably ask for an example of media material with substantial humanities content. I cannot think of an existing model, although Steve Allen's Meeting of Minds is suggestive. In the realm of science, Nova suggests stimulating possibilities that may lend themselves to adaptation for the humanities. In my judgment, those states that have done extensive work with radio are most likely to have produced materials with substantial humanities content. Substantial humanities content is always expressed in words, and radio is its natural and adequate medium. If television is used, substantial humanities content will be achieved as it is in radio, by discussion by people who have a sophisticated capability to think through the meaning and value of human life (i.e., humanists). Film lends itself to substantial humanities content only when it is used in the mode of television. This is normally not advantageous (film is essentially poetic, not discursive).

We have considered using media effectively in terms of quantity, i.e., the number of times a given item is used over a period of time, or the total size of the audience that it may reach. Let us now take a brief moment to consider using media effectively in terms of quality, and more precisely, in terms of the quality of the media material itself. Two questions arise: how generous can we afford to be in our critical views of the material we produce? Does popularilty signify success? To begin with the latter, we are all so eager to succeed that it is difficult to resist congratulating ourselves if some media program we funded is praised in the press and widely broadcast. And yet, as one state has noted, there seems to be almost an inverse relationship between the quality of humanities material and its popular acceptance. Until we find some way to assess the audience reaction to broadcast material, wide distribution is an ambiguous measure of quality material, at best. With respect to the former question, I have been surprised at our national meetings by the generous response of humanists to some of our media materials. People who are clearly sophisticated in their understanding of the quality standards regularly applied to theater, literature, and art, seem remarkably inclined to settle for far lower standards when they see a film or TV presentation. I wonder sometimes if we are not all so relieved simply not to have been embarrassed by our media programs that our critical faculties are numbed. On the other hand, more generous standards of criticism may be appropriate in view of the comparative difficulty and relative rarity of media material that manifests the insight, creativity and integrity of the best of art and literature. Do high critical standards suggest elitism in a program that is intended to be populist? There is great need for us to give careful, professional review to the standards by which we measure success in both the production and the use of media materials.

Let me turn now to some remarks addressed to the question: who should be doing what? This essay would not be a reality, nor would this question make sense, were it not for the Federation, providing, as it does, not only the possibility of shared information, but the possibility of collaborative action. While our constitution as individual state programs suggests the primacy of independent and differentiated action, our federation, the common and universal questions proper to the humanities, and the mass potential of the media all argue for increased collaboration. Specifically, I recommend the following:

1. A National Media Staff - let us collaborate to establish a national media staff, satellited upon a major, national media library. Let us charge the national media staff with the task of identifying, evaluating, acquiring, and publicizing the availability of media materials suitable for supporting public humanities programming.

2. "Packaged" Humanities Media Programming - Let us charge the national media staff with the task of assembling components for "packaged" or pre-designed public humanities programs that could be offered to the public through each state committee.

3. Production of Media Programming - Let us charge the national media staff with the task of producing each year some media programming of fundamental value to all the states, not already available from some other source, and involving costs in excess of those that can be supported from a single state budget. This production should be done so as to gradually develop a library of core resources covering all of the most fundamental and common areas traditionally explored by projects funded in the states.

4. State Media Center Activity - that all individual state media center activity, insofar as this involves the collection, packaging, or distribution of media materials, be transferred to the national media staff.

5. State Production Activity - that states begin to focus their media activity in two areas:

a. Humanities Content: that states give high priority in their media funding to low-cost, high-quality, high-level-of-use media programming, involving as many humanists in the state as possible. The major cost of such programming should be the minds of the participants. Low on formal complexity, it may simply be a conversation, it should be high in those things that characterize the humanities: exciting thinking by subtle and disciplined minds, in the context of a universe of ideas, applied to the basic questions of human life. Such material should be designed primarily for broadcast, primarily by radio.

b. Audiovisual Aids: that states consciously shape the production of materials intended to set the stage for humanities activity so that they will be available for many different kinds of projects. The primary medium for such projects is, probably, film (in the case of dramatic or poetic material), television (in the case of journalistic material). Because of the higher cost of such undertakings, that states give priority to projects that are rooted in local concerns, local history, local culture, local situations, and that are not, therefore, likely subjects for collaborative production.

6. Organization & Support of National Efforts - The national media staff should be part of the Federation staff. States should support its activity at about $500,000 per year by awarding grants equal to 5% of their regrant budgets (with NEH approval), or though other special contractual arrangements.

Much more needs to be said about using media effectively in state humanities programs. I hope that this essay will make some helpful contribution to the dialog, and that through our collaborative efforts the media may become a very important part of our activity.

COMMUNICATING THE HUMANITIES THROUGH MASS MEDIA

by

Marvin L. Vawter

For much too long, state programs in the humanities have supported media programs with very expensive price-tags without establishing principles by which to judge the potential effectiveness of such programs. One could argue, perhaps, that state programs fund a lot of projects, media and otherwise, without firm principles. I would like to offer some musings on mass media and the humanities from the perspective of five years as a State Director and from the perspective of some eighteen years of professional activity in media and the humanities, including radio, television, professional and academic theater, and motion pictures.

The work "media" is a much abused word. More often than not, we hear it used as a synonym for "vehicle." In fact, "media" retains its original Latin form and should retain something of its original meaning. "Media" ought to refer, not to a "vehicle" but to something more like a bridge between people and thought, people and imagination, people and structures, and even people and other people.

In the context of the humanities, it should be the burden and responsibility of media to aid in the exploration of human values. For media to serve this purpose, I would argue that life must be a drama and the world must be a stage.

The humanities should also reaffirm the individual and that individual's right to exist independently and pluralistically; and the humanities must do so concretely. In media this has to equal drama. With the exception of the printed media, media do not do well with abstractions. The concrete always works better. Therefore, drama.

But the humanities must also affirm the universality of human experience. In media, this must mean a certain type of drama. Though creative and resting firmly on drama, such a humanities

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program must thrust the viewer against the ultimately real. In a true tragedy, for example, the viewer is carried beyond thought into a realm of visceral and common feeling. The writer of a tragedy does not have to express ideas. He only has to have a world view, a Weltanschauung. Contrary to popular opinion, Shakespeare was no great thinker. Rarely did an original idea emerge from his plays. Yet he had a vision or visions of the universal experience that he dramatized in the particular.

All I am really saying here is that didacticism has no place in great drama; media must contain its own dramatist who releases from the author and creates its own form of magic. But where does that leave the humanities, and even more problematic, where does it leave the professional humanists? The ideal situation is where the professional humanists are also accomplished film makers or television technicians. Obviously this is rare, but we have been several admirable attempts. The other ideal is to seek out the accomplished film maker who has a thorough grounding in the rigorous methodologies of the professional humanist. This is also rare, but again we have all seen some attempts at this.

That really leaves only two possible strategies. Either we can conclude that media and a professional approach to the humanities are incompatible; or, there must be come compromises. The first possibility is that we can compromise on the drama and go to talking heads and mini-lectures and sanctimonious voice-overs. Or, we can compromise on our definitions of "central involvement of professional humanists in the project." I think the choice is obvious, because the humanities are more able to be flexible and therefore must be the flexible partner if there is to be a partnership at all.

There can be humanities content in media programs in situations where the media style or format is that of simply aiming the camera and turning it on. But who would watch after the first few minutes? Similarly, there can be a kind of prostituted humanities content in a media program by tacking on as a kind of tag or commercial interruption, a structured analysis of the program content, but again that is only an encouragement for the audience to go to the refrigerator. I think we must, therefore, redefine -- when using the media -- what we mean by humanities content.

The media -- television, movies, plays -- reach at the intellect through the emotions. I mean the word reach almost in the sense that one uses it as a sailing term. The media affect us, and if they do not affect us they do not reach us. Most of the other kinds of humanities programs are directed to the intellect and call for cognitive response. Forums, symposia, meetings, lectures rarely affect us so much as they inform us. Such programs do not reach for a whole response from a human being, for a connection

of emotions and intellect. They merely ask for -- whether they obtain it or not -- agreement or disagreement. Their language or -- if you will -- their direction is almost entirely verbal. The diction of the media is only partially verbal. It is also visual and aims at the aesthetic and the whole human response. Forums, symposia, etc. -- at best -- aim for a recollection of human experience or an assembling of data that prepares for new human experience.

Media programs should aim for re-experience or new experience, per se. Sound, movement, space, voice in media do not accompany (nor even parallel) each other, but function as elements of equal significance. Almost any symposium, lecture or forum can be divided into discrete parts and the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts -- it is often less.

Media should depend on what Eisenstein, the great Russian motion picture director, called a "monism of ensemble" (when speaking of Kabuki theater) -- each part combining with other parts to create a single unit of theater. And the authentic element of the humanities -- history, literature, philosophy -- can only be a part of that single unit of theater. Thus, what I would call the media team -- the creative film maker or television director and the historian and the philosopher and the anthropologist -- must direct themselves toward the various organs of sensation and build their summation to a grand total provocation of the human brain without taking any notice of which of the several paths they are following.

The humanities, in the context of the media, must be allowed solely to provoke and cannot be forced into a responding mode, into a dialogue and debating mode.

While it may now sound like a cliche, Shakespeare was underscoring a significant aspect of the power of the theater when he had Hamlet say "The Play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king." I would argue that the humanities may still be able, under certain circumstances, to catch the conscience of our audience for value considerations through drama.

But I think I must conclude that the combination of the media and the humanities, with all that implies in terms of cost to our financial resources, should be reserved solely for those times when there is no better way. We should use media when concepts and perceptions of human individuality and human universality can not be captured any other way. Eisenstein was fond of saying, "What shape is a winding staircase? How would you visually describe the word compactly? What is a surging sea?" One can't easily formulate intellectually analyzed answers to these questions. When there are such questions, then the media has its place in the

humanities. When it is essential to reduce visual and aural perceptions to a common denominator, then we should turn to media. But probably not before. When you can isolate a problem, an issue, even an historical event and examine it cognitively, rationally, dispassionately, then you probably don't need media. But as Goethe says, "In nature we never see anything isolated, but everything in connection with something else which is before it, beside it, under it, and over it."

When it is very important to recreate that experience of seeing "everything in connection with something else," then we may need media's camera. But we cannot afford that experience very often.

CREATIVITY AND THE JARGON OF TRUST

by

Mark Rozeen

> If it is an original work you are after, you had better leave it to the individuals... You help them, provide resources, stimulate them, possibly even inspire them, but fundamentally what you have to do is trust them. It is a simply enough proposition but, in practice, television officials simply cannot bring themselves to accept it. They may start with individuals but they get nervous. They set up committees...
>
> No real programme was ever made by a committee. You insure yourself against failure by having a committee, but you also insure yourself against triumph.
>
> Sir Hew Wheldon, The British Experience In Television

We get nervous. Although the comment was made in reference to British television, and the quote itself was excerpted from the recent Carnegie Commission report on public broadcasting, Sir Hew Wheldon cuts to the heart of our dilemma with media.

Simply stated, has the Indiana Committee for the Humanities and other state committees, in an attempt to protect ourselves from funding bad media projects, effectively choked off good media projects? In an effort to stimulate creativity, have we celebrated mediocrity?

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Many of us, either as grant-givers or grant-getters, have labored for nearly a year under the new ICH media guidelines. At first blush they appear to be rather healthy. Considerable thought went into their creation. Over fifty people contributed their comments. Indeed, judging by the situation in other state humanities committees, the Indiana guidelines are "state of the art;" our work has been used in nearly a dozen other areas.

Yet I, for one, have my doubts about their efficacy. For, if you pause to think about it, the guidelines are really designed to stimulate good applications. Our act of faith is that good applications metamorphosize into good projects. To be sure, this Aristotelian leap certainly contains a measure of truth. The application calls for an ability to express an idea clearly and concisely, to synthesize and order diverse strands of information, to weave an integrated tapestry. Equally important, it suggests the areas with which we are most concerned, and it allows for comparative review between requests for rather scarce and precious funds. I suggest that we would all agree, at least in principle, that the power to organize and express ideas is an integral part of the creative process, be the end product of that process a film or a simple essay. And, I think that we might assume that not all media projects are necessarily "humanities" projects, at least in terms of the mission of ICH -- to promote public programs for an adult out-of-school audience. Given our focus, albeit arbitrary, there is a demonstrable need to solicit specific types of information if we wish to support projects consistent with our own goals and objectives.

No, the problem is not with the application or guidelines per se; the dilemma is more fundamental, more radical if you will. The crisis is in our very approach to the funding of media projects, the assumptions we make, the language we use to express ourselves. There is, I contend, a faltering of trust, an ambiguity in our attitude towards creativity that materially affects the people who apply for our grants, the topics that they choose, and the way their projects evolve. While we have, without a doubt, supported numerous media projects of merit, we are, I believe, very close to affirming Sir Hew Wheldon's contention: We have insured ourselves against failure, but we have also insured ourselves against triumph.

I think that this critical tension can be understood by examining the "jargon" we bring to the funding of media grants. By "jargon" I am not speaking of specific words and phrases, although we should probably be called to account for our own mindless academic and bureaucratic cant. Rather, I am interested in the attitudes we bring to the grant-making process, the often unconscious philosophies that color and shape application forms, guidelines, and, ultimately, decisions of yea or nay.

With this notion of "jargon" in mind, let me suggest two ways of approaching media grants which are, to me, often in conflict. The first I would describe as the jargon of the "gambler." The gambler wagers. Bets. Takes risks. Plays a hunch. Even experiments. As a result of the wager, the gambler often wins big. At the same time, the gambler often loses big. The important point is that the gambler moves between two extremes: triumph or failure.

The other mindset is the jargon of the "investor." The investor believes in probability. Security. Predictability. Caution. Balance is a primary virtue as the investor attempts to build an even portfolio, cutting losses and spreading responsibility. As a result of the investment, the investor neither wins big nor loses big; progress is measured in incremental gains, not in boom and bust. Whereas the gambler lives between the extremes of triumph and failure, the investor resides quite comfortably and safely in the middle, insured and assured.

ICH is gradually becoming an investor, a careful manager of the "public trust." To a great extent our drift into the jargon of the investor is justifiable given the situation which we face: we have less money to spend and more people, with more varied interests than in the past, are making legitimate demands on our funds. Also, our projects are becoming more expensive. Projects costing $10,000-$20,000 are increasingly common as compared to the standard fare of a few years ago when programs fell more in the $4,000 range. Certainly no class of projects have been more prey to this inflation than media projects. At our next funding deadline alone we expect to receive ten media proposals requesting up to $300,000 -- a figure equivalent to our entire direct grant from NEH.

But equally important is our own history as a granting agency. While we have most certainly supported some interesting and important media projects, by and large they have not been stellar. After seven years of watching public programs, we are, for better or worse, able to predict the fate of many of our endeavors. Similarly, we have had a chance to see what our fellow state humanities committees have done, which also helps to shape our expectations. Experience informs, but it also dulls. We get nervous.

A cousin to experience and "maturity" is the growing cult of "professionalism." Not only are we an experienced bureaucracy, but we are an established bureaucracy, one under continual scrutiny by NEH and Congress. Thus, the disposition of federal funds, at least psychologically, breeds a concern with corporate responsibility and public accountability -- buzz words of the fretful 1970's. Responsibility and accountability are acted out in the costumes of "professionalism;" we speak about reporting, evaluation, management, fiscal procedures, public relations, and fund raising

with fervor even if we cannot muster much enthusiasm. Once again, these legitimate concerns may have mediocrity as their handmaiden. We get cautious.

In sum, although we proclaim an ideology of creativity and excellence, we seem equally eager to make safe investments. We want to be assured, via elaborate applications, separate deadlines and guidelines, and review processes that diffuse authority, that we will not fail. But, will we triumph? Ironically, our realpolitik approach could easily turn on us: perhaps the real risk is that our goal of creativity and excellence may be strangled in the name of security.

It is imperative that we rediscover the jargon of the gambler, as difficult as that may be. We must take risks, even if we court failure. And, when we wager, we should bet on creative people, not on comforting applications or insulated committees and institutions.

This desire to gamble means more than wagering our funds; we must also be willing to risk our trust. If we find good people with a good idea, we should get out of the way. It may be an act of faith, but we should occasionally gamble that our media producers may create a good humanities project without conforming to our bureaucratic needs and anxieties. To be sure, if we bet wrong we will lose big. But, it we bet right, we will have our risk repaid a hundred fold.

So where does this clarion call leave us? Clearly, a desire to recapture the jargon of the gambler does not eliminate the very real needs that have led us to the jargon of the investor.

The answer, I suspect, rests upon that important common ground shared by the two mindsets. After all, the gambler and the investor may have quite a bit in common. For, as we all know, no good gambler is a blind gambler. The gambler is a scientist as well as an artist, paying close attention to the odds and the percentages. The wager is not, by definition, wholly impressionistic or irrational; it is no less calculated than most investments. Similarly, the investor who is too timid, overly cautious, and unwilling to venture forth and take risks will soon be left behind. All investment involves change; "pluck and luck" are critical values.

Therefore, if we are to gamble, we pay close attention to the odds. If we are to invest, we must do so boldly, without hesitation. The marriage is of courage and calculation, and this attitude should permeate our media policy as much as possible.

If we have erred to the benefit of the investor, then we should perhaps consider developing structures and options that reintroduce the gambler. Specific programmatic changes could include:

Fewer Media Grants: We could choose to take one or two big chances instead of a multitude of smaller chances. The budget crisis is very real, so we might choose to create a highly competitive situation where we select the most exciting, most innovative project. We could approach the problem as one might create a design competition in architecture.

Stress Innovation and Creativity: We could proceed from the assumption that the only media projects we fund are those that could not be done as adequately as a conventional public program. The onus of responsibility would be on the applicant to demonstrate that this project is truly distinguished, that it makes a special contribution. We should avoid climbing "media mountains" simply because "they're there," to borrow from Sir Edmund Hillary.

Place a Greater Emphasis on the Independent Producer: Our present application project seems to favor institutions and organizations. Independent producers, acting as individuals or in collectives, have been responsible for much of the creative work sponsored by the state committees. We should invest our funds and faith with these creative people.

Make Grant Awards to Creative People Outside of Indiana as Well as Those Within the State: There are, without doubt, many creative souls within Indiana, and these people should continue to receive our support. However, there are also many people who can speak to the humanities in Indiana who do not reside within our borders. We should consider expanding the pool of creativity to include the region, if not the nation.

Use ICH Resources as Leverage with Other Granting Institutions: Other states have experimented quite succesfully with the merger of funds on a bilateral or regional scale. A contribution of $50,000 can become $200,000 when joined with similar commitments from Ohio, Illinois, and Kentucky. A parallel argument can be posed for the distribution of materials; the political borders of our states are somewhat artifical in the world of broadcasting and syndication.

Give Greater Freedom to the Creators of Media Products in Their Conduct under the Grant Contract, Especially in the Areas of Copyright, Distribution, and the Generation of Income: Although public funds are involved in the creation of ICH media products, the creative effort itself comes from the producers. This creativity is, to me, an *a priori* right to control the destiny of the final product. We should encourage self-interest among our media producers, reserving specific and limited rights to

access to the materials and some share in any net income that the materials might produce.

Put Greater Stock in the Visual and Oral Track Record of Applicants and Less Faith in the Written Proposal: What our producers do is far more important than what they say. We should expect a well organized, literate proposal, but we should not expect a literary masterpiece. Similarly, we should take the strengths of the idea and the talent of the applicant into more direct account, and place less of an emphasis on documentation; do we really need advanced commitments from broadcasters or public programs planned out before the project even begins?

All of this, of course, should be added to a general attempt to give our project directors more freedom to make decisions. Naturally, freedom can be abused and, in many cases it will be. We should expect such abuse. But if we are serious about promoting creative media projects, we must adopt a new jargon -- the jargon of mutual trust. For, I believe, our media producers care about the humanities as much as we do; given a fair chance, they won't do us wrong.

PART V THE POLITICS OF STATE PROGRAMS

Humanities Programs, Accountability and State Government — James Veninga — 105

In this essay, James Veninga describes the distinctive public-yet-private status of state humanities committees and states boldly the questions unfriendly critics ask; questions frequently left unstated in deliberations about the future of the programs. Is formal compliance sufficient warrant for continued operation? Should the committees be seeking other resources? Are other resources actually available? And, are the committees truly accountable?

HUMANITIES PROGRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE GOVERNMENT

by

James Veninga

There have been, from time to time, numerous misconceptions, and misunderstandings concerning the nature, function, and purpose of arts and humanities programs in the various states. Undoubtedly, one explanation for the problem has to do with the relationship between the arts and the humanities, the similarities and differences, the problem of definition, and the varying ways in which these activities contribute to the substance of American cultural life. Another explanation, however, lies in the different state groups and agencies that have been established to further arts and humanities interests, and the differing organizational structures and programming missions adopted.

I will confine my remarks to, first, a brief outline of the essential characteristics of our humanities program in Texas and, secondly, to an analysis of this structure, with particular reference to its volunteer, private nature, characteristics which are true of all state humanities programs.

There are a number of essential organizational characteristics of the Texas Committee for the Humanities. First, it is a volunteer, private organization, yet functions very much like a quasi-governmental unit. It is composed of twenty-five members, with membership drawn equally from the academic and public sectors. Members serve terms of office of four years.

Secondly, the Texas Committee is an organization whose members and staff are dedicated to the humanities. This dedication is essential

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to service on the Committee. Every person on the Texas Committee is there because he or she wants to serve by virtue of a desire to further the development of the humanities. The same is true with the staff of the Committee. This commitment has given a unique sense of mission to the Committee.

Thirdly, the Committee is an organization which serves as a catalyst for the development of a partnership between government and the private sector. As a volunteer, private committee, it is in a unique position to promote various kinds of alliances. In a state where there is a fairly strong distrust of government, of bureaucracy, this structure serves us well. At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that the Texas Committee, as in the case of other state committees, is just beginning to understand what this role as catalyst might mean. I would anticipate the development of new alliances and partnerships over the next several years.

Allow me to return to the first characteristic, for that is the one that we are currently concerned with at this conference. The volunteer organizational structure of the Committee pervades all activities undertaken. It can be evidenced in the many volunteers that serve as staff members and participants in project activities. It can be seen in the fact that the offices of the Texas Committee are donated, and in the many support services given to the Committee. Volunteerism brings with it a spirit of commitment and involvement. In Texas, all Committee members are responsible for reviewing all grant applications exceeding $1,500. Attendance at quarterly committee meetings averages better than 80%. Members are active in the various sub-committees; officers assume a major and vital role in the planning of the program.

As a <u>private</u> organization, the Committee (1) determines programming priorities and plans, (2) is responsible for hiring staff and setting salaries, (3) determines the merits of grant applications and the allocation of funds, (4) evaluates its successes and failures, (5) elects its own members through an open nominations process that is publicized, and (6) has the freedom to develop new programs.

As a <u>quasi-governmental</u> organization, the Committee (1) is responsible for handling federal funds for authorized activities and must take all necessary procedures, as in the case of a public agency, for ensuring fiscal and programming integrity, (2) must be in compliance with all federal legislation concerning the program to ensure continued funding, and (3) is accountable to the citizens of the state, thereby ensuring adequate public information procedures, open meetings, a conflict-of-interest policy, the publication of an annual report, and other activities and procedures designed to keep citizens informed of Committee activities.

The strengths underlying this program and organizational structure are, I believe, clear.

First, the present structure has worked. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated by the clear sense of mission and dedication that has resulted in specific and constructive plans and policies, and by the integrity of the organization, as seen in the review process established for grant applications, fiscal procedures adopted, and qualifications established for members and staff.

Secondly, the program capitalizes on and expresses the essence of certain aspects of American political thought and experience: the proper and limited role of the federal government, volunteerism, the encouragement of responsibility and dedication in furthering program goals, controlling bureaucracy and limiting, as much as possible, the infamous rad tape that Americans are increasingly rejecting.

Thirdly, the program has been free from undue political pressure. There is no need to allocate funds according to legislative district, population or any other extraneous factor. The Committee has an obligation to ensure equal access to its funds by qualifying organizations, thereby ensuring that each application is evaluated on the basis of merit.

Fourthly, as previously mentioned, the state humanities Committee is in a unique position to encourage the involvement of the private sector and to form new alliances and partnerships. It can work constructively with public and private universities and schools, with state agencies, with corporations, and with foundations.

In spite of these strengths, it is clear that the state humanities program is still greeted with moderate skepticism in some circles. All serious questions about organizational structure seem to revolve around the issue of accountability, and this issue needs closer analysis.

The strengths of the state program are derived, I believe, from the sense of mission and purpose which has been a part of the program from the beginning. Should this sense of mission and purpose wane, should there be foundering, should a particular state program seem ineffective, where are the controls, one might ask, to ensure integrity and responsibility?

The primary external control lies at the federal level, as the National Endowment for the Humanities reviews grant proposals from the various states and analyses state programs to determine compliance with federal legislation. What if a state is in compliance with the law, but is not doing a very good job? Will it continue to receive the minimum level of funding as provided by

the legislation? Who would receive these funds if the NEH rules the Committee to be incompetent or inadequately organized?

At the state level, state government has no control over the program, outside of the appointments made by the Governor. Undoubtedly, governors as well as congresspersons and members of state legislatures can express either their pleasure or displeasure over the state humanities program, but state government does not have the authority to exercise control over the program.

The question, "Should state committees be more accountable to state government?" is a legitimate question. The national legislation of 1976 sought to address this question and provided the means for an increasing role on the part of state government. The Governor of each state could, in fact, appoint one-half the membership of the state humanities committee, if the state matched federal funds with state funds. The legislation also provided for additional measures, such as the submittal of an annual report to the chief executive officer and other persons that he might designate.

How can state committees be accountable to the state without losing their private, volunteer nature? Are the minimum requirements of the legislation of 1976 enough? I believe that these requirements should be seen as basic legal requirements and that efforts should be taken to go beyond them in the furtherance of programming objectives, to not just report to the Governor, but to seek his advice and suggestions, to work cooperatively with various state agencies, and with state representatives and senators.

Given this challenge, one can identify the key issues confronting state humanities committees as private, volunteer organizations.

First, how can each state committee best serve the interests of its state? This question has been raised extensively by the legislation of 1976 which afforded each committee new freedom in determining program design. Most states have dealt with the issue of whether to retain their current program or to adopt a broader program. A formal response to this issue is the first step in determining future programming directions. Until now, responses to this issue have been primarily on the use of federal dollars only for traditional kinds of projects. For example, state committees have not, by and large, explored the role of the Committee and all resources that might be open to it, in regard to the development of humanities curricula in secondary and primary schools of the state, the development of local urban humanities councils, means whereby young writers, poets, and novelists can be encouraged and the talented can find a market for their work, ways of overcoming the devastating consequences of the under and un-employment of people trained in the humanities,

and cooperative, formal arrangements that can be made with business and the various professions in regard to use of humanistic resources. How far should state committees go in assuming a position of leadership within the states? Where will state committees find the resources to accomplish this? More federal money? Private money? State money? Is the lure of possible state dollars going to ultimately sacrifice the merits of the volunteer, private structure that has been successful?

Secondly, how can state committees retain the volunteer, private nature of their organization, which has worked well for this national humanities effort, while being accountable to state government? I am convinced that state humanities committees do not have to be state agencies to be accountable to the state. Perhaps public agencies may have a difficult time accepting this fact. If so, in spite of the evidence that exists regarding present accountability, one can ask the question: would an organization by necessity be more responsive to the needs of citizens and more responsible in terms of handling tax-payers dollars by virtue of being a public agency? The history of state agencies within many states, including Texas, provides an answer upon which most of us would, I think, agree.

Should state committees function more and more as public agencies, seeking, for instance, gubernatorial appointments equal to one-half the membership and state funds matching federal funds, one must acknowledge the inevitable tensions that could arise as arts commissions and historical commissions and other agencies seek their fair share of limited state resources.

Aside from the fact that the uniqueness of the state program as seen in the volunteer structure and sense of mission and dedication, could be threatened, such efforts might, indeed, undermine the unique position that state committees currently hold in furthering the cultural life of the state. State humanities committees can assist arts commissions in their struggle for adequate funding and the historical commissions in their need for further state support. The extent to which humanities entities in the various states could function to further new alliances and partnerships, as mentioned earlier, might be in doubt.

What unites those disciplines and activities that we call the humanities is a concern for public and private values. It is appropriate, I think, that given this basis, the NEH and Congress has implemented a public humanities program itilizing private, volunteer citizens committees. There is compatibility between the nature of humanistic inquiry and the private organizational structure of the state humanities program.

It would be a sad day in the life of American culture and politics if all governmental programs had to be implemented exactly the

same way, regardless of innate differences in programming focus or areas of jurisdiction. Private committees have served well the interests of the public and the interests of the humanities community. There is need, of course, for continual improvement in terms of both quality programming and organizational structure. Likewise, as the history of politics and governmental programs indicate, the evolution of programs and structures designed to meet the purposes of government is a given fact.

State humanities committees, as with state arts commissions, are experiencing considerable change. We are called upon to reflect objectively on where we have been, on the principles and values underlying our present structures and efforts, on opportunities that are before us, and on the best means available to fulfill those opportunities.

It is important to acknowledge the unique and successful experiment of the NEH and Congress in utilizing volunteer citizen committees in the implementation of the public humanities program. At the same time, we must also acknowledge the potential challenges of this effort, particularly in regard to the issue of accountability to state government, as we build upon accomplishments to date. It is clear that we must be open to new programming opportunities, and that what is fundamentally important is the fulfillment of those opportunities, rather than the preservation of particular organizational structures. Structures must serve programs.

PART VI PAST AND PRESENT

The Three Threats to State Programs — John Barcroft — 113

In 1973 John Barcroft described the hopes and the threats to them for the new state humanities programs. The threats he saw as the loss of a spirit of adventure, the failure to strike a deep enough chord with the public and a loss of objectivity. "This is not a program for the faint of heart," he warned, "and the only thing which makes it tolerable is some vision of what the program might do for the state, for the country and for the humanities."

State Humanities Committees: Difficulties Remain, But They Fare Well — Charles Trueheart — 117

Charles Trueheart reviews the growth of the state humanities councils, their wary relationship with their state governments, and their cooperation with art agencies. The programs are often criticized for their humanities content. Yet, he says, "Those who believe that the state committees as they're presently constituted are functioning successfully are a decided majority -- albeit a cautious and sensitive majority after the experience of the last reauthorization."

Against Claptrap and For the Complexity of Things — B.J. Stiles — 125

B.J. Stiles' essay ends this collection of papers with a reflection on his first year with the state programs. He quotes Daniel Webster, saying "'The greatest of all warriors in the siege of Troy had not the preeminence because nature had given him strength and he carried the largest bow, but because self discipline had taught him how to bend it.' . . . I am amazed at the ways in which many of you discipline so effectively the bending of the bow."

THE THREE THREATS TO STATE PROGRAMS

by

John Barcroft

I should like to state what I think are reasonable hopes for the state-based programs by 1976, and then to mention some potential threats to those hopes* I think we might all reasonably hope for four things. That by 1976 the structure of the program is solid and able to withstand bad weather in each state; that the public policy focus of this program is fully understood, fully tested, and proved of value to a broad public in each state; that the public in significant numbers and significant variety has participated in the program and found it both of value and worth their confidence; and that the humanities have so fully infused the program that everyone in the United States will see this program as manifestly a program in the humanities. All four of these hopes are of course interrelated.

The structure is crucial. A strong working committee, fully conversant with the program in their state, committeed to its success, and representative of the variety of the state, is the minimal acceptable structure. Such a committee will know when it should gamble, and when it should throw an anchor windward. Only such a committee will in the long run be able to root the program deeply in the state, achieve the cooperation

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*Editor's Note: This essay was presented at a national conference of state humanities programs in Washington, D.C., May, 1973. Mr. Barcroft's references to "1976" and the immediate future of the state programs have been left unedited in order that current readers have a glimpse of the developmental stages of the program.

of all the resources necessary to make a state-based program functional rather than symbolic, and acquire the financial resources necessary to match Endowment program funds and supplement Endowment administrative funding. Such a committee will want strong staff assistance, which is another reason the committee must be able to command resources in the state. In some states, the creation of such a committee by the initial members have had to work extremely hard. Yet conceding the difficulty, nothing less than full success will permit the state-based program to work in a state at greatly increased levels of activity.

The focus on genuine public policy issues is crucial. This is what the Congress has requested, this is what the National Council on the Humanities has made its conviction on, and this is what the strongest and most articulate members of both the public and the academic community have found as their common goal in the state-based program. It is what gives the program its moral urgency, and without it, the program is in danger of becoming an interesting anomaly and no more. Clearly, there are public issues which are too small for the humanities, and public issues which are too vague to permit analysis. But the idea of exploring the ways in which the humanities can aid in the understanding of public issues is an important one, and it deserves a full and fair test in every state. Well before 1976, it must have had one.

The public is crucial. All aspects of the Humanities Endowment must in the final analysis serve the public, as our Chairman suggested yesterday. And the state-based program must serve the public directly. Reaching broader and more varied publics is therefore a major test of the worth of the program. This is an area where the present success in particular bodes well for the future. The testing of new formats, the trying of new media, and the articulation of the program to new constituencies will no doubt be a characteristic of most state-based programs in the next few years, and will further increase the impact of individual projects and of the overall program in each state. I believe there is ample evidence that the state-based program already belongs to the public. By 1976, we can hope that that evidence will be incontrovertible.

Finally, the humanities, and the humanist, are crucial. This is not a program in public dialogue; it is a program in the humanities. It is not a program in policy analysis and resolution; it is a program in the humanities. And the reason we all want the program to belong to the public is that we want the humanities to belong to the public. The large number of humanists who now sit on state committees, the still larger number who have committed themselves to the projects of state committees, and the eloquent comments we heard on Wednesday morning all suggest that the humanist can effectively involve himself in this program, and is willing to do so. We humanists are, after all, durable creatures. We surely existed in a primitive form before governments did; and after governments

are gone, there will still be historians explaining why they're gone, philosophers examining how to live now that they're gone, and students of literature preserving their bardic tales. Because we care about the humanities, and many of us care about the public, we humanists want to be a fundamental part -- not owners, but a part -- of this program. By 1976, perhaps that public which is larger than any of its parts will see us as a useful part of itself -- because of the state-based program.

These, then, are some possible hopes for the program in 1976. There seem to me to be three possible threats which could dash those hopes. The first is that the program will lose its present spirit of adventure, and become just another Federal program. The second is that it will fail to strike a deep enough chord of response in a large enough part of the public. And the third is that it will lose its objectivity. Each of these deserves brief comment.

The Endowment is playing for blood in the state-based program, and the state committees are as well. This is not a program for the faint of heart, and the only thing which makes it tolerable is some vision of what the program might do for the state, for the country, and for the humanities. Against that motivation lies the suffocating hand of twenty years of Federal programs which lured people into frenetic activity, and then turned out at base to be not worth the effort. One state committee chairman, in fact, has recently expressed that view to me about the state-based program. Obviously if that perception becomes general, this program is dead. I believe that administrative budgets, grant periods and amounts, fiscal agent fees, allowable per diems, and committee composition are serious matters of concern and legitimate matters for discussion between the Endowment and those in the states. But when the dialogue between the Endowment and the committee is primarily on these matters -- in short, on everything except the substance of the program -- then I think we have jointly managed to create a program which is just another Federal program. That is not what the country needs.

The second threat is that the program will not find and touch the public. It certainly has already found much of the public, and it seems genuinely to have touched some of the public. But in the final analysis, it will not be the Endowment, and not the members of state committees, who sustain the state-based program. It will be the public in its broadest sense, who by their voices and through their taxes permit the program to continue and to grow. This is true now; it will be truer when significant funds are required, or when significant opposition to the program occurs. And if the program has not sought, found, and touched the public, it ought not grow.

The third threat is that the program will lose its objectivity. If it does, there will be significant opposition to its continuance

and growth. We are, so far, in a very fortunate circumstance. The Endowment has broad bipartisan support. The same is true of the state-based program. More to the point, the state-based program is new enough, and exists in full operation in few enough states, that a full-scale assessment of the program would be premature. There is great goodwill toward the program at all levels, and a disposition to take the program on faith, as having integrity, as being fully grounded in the humanities, and as therefore not an advocacy or polemical program. It is viewed as a program which permits dispassionate contextual discussion of issues in the public interest. In short, it is viewed as objective. Once that is lost, everyone involved in the state-based program is naked to our enemies. Who is the enemy? Who, or what, is this program against? It is against claptrap. It is against slogans as the new panacea remedy for thought. It is against 30-minute solutions to 300-year problems. It is for the complexity of things, for individual informed choice, for reason and tolerance. It is not for liberals; it is not for conservatives; it is not for malcontents; it is not for the complacent; it is not anybody's boy. It is for the humanities and for the public. It is not enough for us all to be able to say this, however. It has to be true.

STATE HUMANITIES COMMITTEES:

DIFFICULTIES REMAIN, BUT THEY FARE WELL

by

Charles Trueheart

It has fallen to the National Endowment for the Humanities, in the words of its charter, to foster "public understanding and appreciation of the humanities." And it may be that the Endowment's state programs -- in which volunteer citizens' groups, composed of a balanced mix of humanities scholars and concerned lay people, distribute federal funds for public projects in the humanities -- represent the fulfillment of that mandate.

Today the Endowment's Division of State Programs commands, by statute, no less than twenty per cent of the total NEH budget -- $22 million this year -- the largest share of any division. Under the 1976 legislation which gave institutional permanence to the fledgling state programs, every state committee is entitled to a minimum $200,000 annual grant. In practice, each committee is awarded a good deal more, commonly twice that amount, based in part on a state population formula and in part on the record and promise of its program. The state committees are also required to match their federal grant with local donations, most of them "in kind" contributions of goods and services.

The 51 committees (there's one in Puerto Rico and another is being developed for the District of Columbia), by comparison to other recipients of substantial federal funds, are remarkably autonomous. They draw on residents of their own states for members, establish their own procedures, elect their own leadership, and hire their

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own staff. The size and scope of the projects they support is equally a matter of their own discretion. Most of them belong to a professional association, located in Minneapolis, which they created and now support directly: the Federation of Public Programs in the Humanities. Their responsibility to the parent Endowment is chiefly fiscal; and unless they abuse their freedom, Washington stays out of their hair.

It is no small irony, then, that these virtually independent entities, representing the Endowment's most consciously "public" and non-scholarly efforts at exposing out-of-school American adults to humanistic questions, are facing a challenge based in large degree on their accountability to the states whose people they serve. Independence from Washington, apparently, does not a "public" program make. The shape of the state programs in the 1980's, consequently, will depend on whether Congress decides this year that they have exercised their freedom responsibly and agrees to reauthorize funds for their continuance.

To understand the source and substance of the challenge, it is worth knowing something about how the state committees came to be and the direction they've taken since then.

When the sister arts and humanities endowments were created in 1965, official arts agencies already existed in a number of states, in some cases carrying the name "humanities" as well. Consequently, the National Endowment for the Arts used those existing entities to administer their state arts funds.

Not so NEH, which resisted the creation of state programs in its early days and found Congress willing to defer to its judgement. By 1970, however, some members of Congress were determined to localize part of the humanities endowment's work. NEH was instructed to experiment with state-based programs.

Two other impulses were linked, logically or not, to that one. At the time, the nation was in the throes of social upheaval. The decade just ending had seen racial unrest, war in Vietnam, assassinations, and increased crime and campus revolt; and both the Congress and the Endowment's advisory body, the National Council on the Humanities, wondered how and what the humanities might have to say about these issues of national concern.

The third influence leading to the creation of the state committees was a renewed congressional reminder that the Endowment, in its years of support of scholarship, might have short-changed the "public appreciation" charge of its charter. These three impulses, chiefly congressional in origin -- that the NEH experiment with state programs, address questions of pressing concern, and strengthen the involvement of the general public -- became one. Together they defined the nature of the early efforts in the states.

In 1970, the Endowment began to design its state programs. It used six states as testing grounds for three possible structures the state programs might assume. The requirement was simply that every state program be answerable to the broadest humanities constituency -- that its loyalties be neither divided nor circumscribed. In Oklahoma and Maine, the Endowment set up volunteer humanities councils through the offices of existing arts agencies in state governments. In Missouri and Georgia, it did the same through university extension and continuing education facilities. And in Oregon and Wyoming, independent volunteer committees drawn from humanities institutions and the general public were created ex nihilo. In the view of the experimental groups and the Endowment alike, the last model worked best, and it stuck.

By 1971, then, the Endowment had a procedures which state humanities committees were expected to follow. First, an NEH representative would set up shop in a state, "inventory" its humanities institutions, programs, and particular concerns, and collect a list of perhaps 100 people, including administrators, humanities scholars, and members of the public with some manifest interest in or commitment to the humanities.

That list was ther winnowed to a small group of, say, a half-dozen people who had responded enthusiatically to the notion of a volunteer citizens' humanities committee. They were brought to Washington by the Endowment for intensive discussions and orientation. The group then went home, invited others to swell the ranks of the committee to about 20, hired a small staff, and applied to the Endowment for seed money. By 1975, all the states had followed this procedure and were enjoying the support of the Endowment in developing their programs.

They were barely on their feet, then, when, in 1975, hearings to reauthorize the Endowment's statutory charter rolled around. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), whose subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Senate Committee on Human Resources oversees the Endowment budget, believed the model the state committees followed was a poor one. He described their formation as a "Laying-on of hands" from Washington. He believed -- and still believes -- that the Endowment's work in the states ought to be carried out by entities far more responsive to the citizens of the states. He had in mind formal state agencies, accountable to legislatures whose members were accountable in turn to the taxpayers. Ideally, in his view, state funds would be among those the humanities programs would distribute.

In the 1975 reauthorization hearings, the Endowment's then chairman, Ronald Berman, took issue with Pell's plan to convert the humanities committees to state agencies. The hub-bub that ensued, far from addressing the best structure for the state programs, concerned whether the Endowment as a whole was perpetuating

"elitism" -- so claimed Berman's detractors -- or whether it was to be vulgarized into "populism" -- so contended Pell's accusers. It is the prospect of just such a mudfight during this year's reauthorization process that horrifies people on the state committees, on Capital Hill, and at the Endowment. Their fear is not misplaced.

As it happened, the state committees retained their formal independence from state governments -- with a few provisos. One was that the governor of any state willing to match the federal investment in its humanities program could appoint half its members. If the state chose not to do so -- and to date none have so chosen -- the governor was empowered to appoint two members.

The 1976 legislation required the committees to formalize their procedures concerning terms of service, rotation of officers, and the like and to report to the governor and the citizens of the state. In the more relaxed political atmosphere of the mid-1970's, moreover, the requirement that humanities projects have an explicit bearing on public policy issues was dropped. The state committees, in effect, were given the same freedoms enjoyed by the Endowment itself -- as long as they remain attentive to public needs.

In effect, Berman and Pell had reached a compromise. Pell's interest in the committees' accountability to the states was met in part, while Berman's concern to preserve the committees' autonomy was also served. Whether fully state-controlled humanities agencies are in the cards is a matter of conjecture as the 1980 hearings loom.

Those who believe that the state committees as they're presently constituted are functioning successfully are a decided majority -- albeit a cautious and sensitive majority after the experience of the last reauthorization. They believe in the concept of independent volunteer committees and consider its success worthy of emulation in other federally-endowed programs. They believe the humanities groups promote an unprecedented alliance of scholars, interested citizens, and politicians in every state. B.J. Stiles, an Endowment deputy director who oversees the state programs, says he has seldom seen "humanistic specialists demonstrate as much commitment to public activities, nor as much respect by public members for scholarly activities" as he has on the state committees.

A thoughtful and even-handed study of the state agency question, prepared by the Texas Committee for the Humanities, suggests that many of the humanities projects -- which constitute "public reflection upon government and upon the relationship between government and society" -- are best served by "organizations that need not fear governmental interference." In other words, what Senator

Pell may regard as a committee's insularity could be its greatest strength. Its independence from state government may guarantee its neutrality, and its neutrality may be its greatest asset.

The state committees worry too that, as state agencies, they might lose what little visibility they now command. As one among hundreds of state agencies vying for a share of the budget, their efforts might be frustrated. Appropriations aside, there is reason to believe that a humanities committee existing as part of a vast governing apparatus might suffer from the vicissitudes of excessive paperwork and bureaucratic featherbedding; the experience of state arts councils testifies to that fear.

The fate of the state-agency plan may rest, finally, not with the desires of members of Congress but with the mood of the states themselves. These days, at any rate, legislatures may not be keen to increase their budgetary commitments -- especially in areas legislators have ample reason to believe are heavily funded as it is, through appropriations to libraries, museums, and, of course, higher education.

The impetus for a change in status may have to originate with the state humanities committees themselves. As their programs proliferate and expand, the federal government's support simply may be insufficient and the closer partnership of state governments ever more attractive. Martin Schwartz, a Muncie businessman who has served on the Indiana Committee for the Humanities since its inception, believes that "some day, the government may cut all this off. And if it's worthwhile, then the people ought to be willing to carry it on."

The evolution of the state committees since the 1976 legislation suggests that they still possess a remarkable enthusiasm and energy. The waiver of what might be called the relevancy requirement four years ago freed some of them to explore more traditionally-conceived areas of the humanities, without regard to their public policy context. Other committees still insist on a direct application to current issues. It is a matter of their own discretion.

In recent years, the state groups have each sponsored anywhere from 15 to 100 projects a year, in amounts as small as $300 for a single program of limited scope to as large as $50,000 for an ambitious public television series.

Discussions, workshops, exhibits, media presentations, and lectures have explored such topics as the First Amendment, the future, consumerism, death and dying, hunting and wildlife, the effects of the Vietnam War, prisons, literacy, the Jewish experience, work and leisure, the small businessman, tourism, two-career marriages, "controversies in taste," retrospectives on local or state figures,

nursing ethics, small claims mediation, and poetry in sign language. Many state committees have had a hand in supporting successful community and oral history projects, now that strictly local concerns, without regard to larger issues of public policy, are acceptable areas of interest.

Evidently, if there are limits to what state humanities groups may support, they have not yet been found. The sometimes ambiguous demarcation between arts and humanities has given some committees pause. Martin Schwartz in Indiana, for instance, remembers a proposal to establish an opera in Indianapolis. "That discussion lasted about thirteen seconds," he says. On the other hand, a film series qualifies as a humanities project if the films address an issue to which the humanities may have something to say.

If such an interpretation sounds subjective, it is. But there have been few border wars between state humanities and arts groups; cooperation, instead, has been the rule. The problem of definition, however, is far from marginal. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the concern articulated by Senator Pell: the nature of the humanities themselves.

As staff and committee members see it, unlike the arts, the humanities are not by nature "public." It is less difficult to document the reach and accessibility of the arts because they are inherently public -- performed, seen, received. The humanities, for their part, are cerebral, ineffable, easily mistaken for something else (the philosophical doctrine of humanism, for example, or humanitarianism). Defined only with difficulty -- and never without spirited argument -- it is little wonder that their public value is no less difficult to justify. Given this problem of identity, complaints that the state committees are not as visible as they might be, or as their sister arts agencies have become, are no surprise.

So if the state committees have been late bloomers, it may have as much to do with the nature of the humanities as with structure or process or "accountability." This is not to say, however, that the committees are immune from criticism.

William J. Bennett, executive director of the National Humanities Center in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, told the national meeting of the state committees in Albuquerque last fall that much of the work they sponsor is, in a word, "boring." Bennett, who is far from alone in this conviction, feels the lingering obsession among committees with the old public policy requirement is unfortunate. "You force humanists to talk about things tney know nothing about. It doesn't show humanists at their best."

The state committees, he believes, have been "too shy, too diffident" about recruiting academics to undertake projects in their area of expertise. As a result, he says, humanities scholars look on a project as "a favor and not an act of citizenship. To them, it's just an opportunity to talk to citizens for money, so the responses are predictable. This is a very status-conscious profession, and Podunk, Kansas on a Saturday afternoon is not perceived to be as good as a workshop at Harvard."

Benjamin DeMott, an Amherst College English professor and a member of the Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy, shares some of Bennett's skepticism about the kinds of projects his group finances -- particularly its emphasis on "applying" traditional humanities concerns to some public issue. One example of what he terms "false relevance" was a project in another state in which the problems of doctors in provincial areas were to be illuminated by a reading of Madame Bovary. "I guess it worked, but that's about as goddamn remote as you can get. The whole enterprise was hilarious and repugnant."

DeMott also suggests that the committee system, as presently constructed, breeds a homogeneity in the projects that win approval. Not many of the non-academic public members have the time or inclination to read 600 pages of application material three or four times a year. This, he contends, works to shut out people "who don't necessarily think high culture is a good thing, people who aren't schooled and acculturated to a piety." The exceptions on his committee, De Mott said, were valuable because "one of them would erupt and say 'I don't think I'd be interested in this thing for ten minutes.' But that kind of eruption has gotten rarer."

The former director of the New York Council for the Humanities, Ronald Florence, believes the problem may be deeper. The humanities, he said, "are not a communicative concept to most people, so to attract people you have to compromise the humanities. Most of the time, they're either real humanities programs nobody goes to, or they're popular programs that have nothing to do with the humanities."

That problem -- to the extent it is one -- is seldom stated so starkly. Most state committees are encouraged by the quality of the programs they're funding and the numbers of people they're reaching. Even the harshest critics have words of praise for the hard work and earnest intentions of the committees.

As the 1980 reauthorization hearings loom, some of these criticisms will be measured against the impressive strides the state humanities programs have made in their brief life. A key staff member on the responsible Senate subcommittee believes the state committees have "come a long way" since the 1976 legislation. The state committees would agree with that assessment and hope that Congress will too.

AGAINST CLAPTRAP

AND FOR THE COMPLEXITY OF THINGS

by

B.J. Stiles

I will endeavor not to diminish the exhilaration that has built throughout this Conference. This has been an illuminating and stimulating conference. In this culminating session, Adrian Malone has stimulated us to return to our tasks recharged to pursue our work, our mission and our challenges, with a grander understanding of the unique and not insignificant opportunities confronting state humanities programs.

Good wine heightens and blooms with age. That aging process tests the durability and quality of the prime ingredients. Perhaps something similar happens in the evolution of society. For example, in Rome we see the physical evidences of a civilization which flowered and faded; in Samoa we see through microcosm the essential stages of life and the primary aspects of human living in family and society. Here in Philadelphia we place ourselves in at least physical proximity to the founding of consititutional democracy in the New World, and we symbolically acknowledge the youthfulness, indivisibility and vitality of an experiment which could only be conceived and encouraged in a democratic society: humanities programs for the public, supported by public funds derived and administered through a federal system of taxation and government and dispensed by voluntary organizations comprised of academic humanists and public citizens, namely state programs in the humanities.

B.J. STILES, Director of the Division of State Programs, NEH, closed the 1979 National Meeting of State Humanities Programs with some reflections on the mission of the state programs.

In my first year in this program, my life has been dominated by traveling, reading and listening. The travel has taken me, thus far, to eighteen states, and it would have been twenty except for an unexpected Congressional hearing and a bout with the flu. That's been supplemented with three National Meetings of State Programs, four regional directors meetings, four meetings with the Federation Executive Committee, three experimental regional orientation conferences, and five panels and four meetings of our National Council. In twelve short months that's 41 meetings consuming about a third of the year.

I've also been stimulated to listen, and communicate on your behalf, to collegial organizations such as the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, National Public Radio, the White House Conferences on Families and the energy forums. The travel also demands readings: about you, for you, and with you. I will not quote from any of that reading that has to do with ZBB reports or OMB budgets or even Congressional testimony, as fine as it has been, especially when it has come from state programs.

I would like to quote briefly, however, from a reference which reminds me of the context in which we work. I think it is applicable because it pertains to making informed judgments and critical use of our intellectual and human resources. It is an excerpt of a commencement address in 1845, and with the exception of the sexism of the language, I found it remarkably pertinent to today, with emphases upon the training of the young, the function of the scholar, and indirectly, the mission of state programs.

The quote is from Daniel Webster: "Costly apparatus and splendid cabinets have no magical power to make scholars. In all circumstances as man is under God the master of his own fortune, so is he the maker of his own mind. The Creator has so constituted the human intellect that it can grow by its own action only, and by its own action it will certainly and necessarily grow. Every man must therefore, educate himself. His book and teacher are but helps, the work is his. A man is not educated until he has the ability to summon, in any emergency, all his mental powers to vigorous exercise and control them in that exercise to affect his proposed object. It is not the man who has seen most, or read most, or heard most, who can do this. Such a man is in danger of being borne down like a beast of burden by an overwhelming mass of other men's thoughts. Nor is it the man who can boast of native vigor and capacity. The greatest of all warriors in the siege of Troy had not the preeminence because nature had given him strength and he carried the largest bow, but because self-discipline had taught him how to bend it."

Most of my reading this year centered on your writing. Although the bulk of your writing focuses of necessity on reports, proposals and other administrative documents, I am very aware and greatly appreciative of how frequently these documents attest to the significance of our mission. I am brash enough to quote from one state's proposal not as an exception but as a gratifying example: "What does NCH do? What does NCH fund? The answers are varied. NCH gives grants to hundred of programs that appeal to the mind and the heart and the spirit. There's the intellectual discussion on medical ethics and the audience sits and asks questions and exchanges views. There's an auditorium of 1,500 participants responding to Black Elk Speaks. Middle class whites distant from the problems of Wounded Knee and Native Americans reliving their heritage together. There's a group of older people reminiscing. A black man in his eighties recalls with equanimity his parents' lowered heads as they crossed to the other side of the street at the approach of a white. A Chicano and a white both recall life in South Omaha during the heyday of the big slaughter and the packing house era. Whatever the form, what NCH funds involves people discussing, questioning, responding, sometimes angrily, disgustedly, animatedly with enthusiasm for having gained an understanding that wasn't there before."

And, briefly, from the reviewers, who occasionally give kudos as well as criticisms: "This proposal is crisp and to the point. It exhibits a quality of conservativism in its adaptation of its past program guidelines to the new dimensions of state-based activities, yet it is open to pragmatic innovation. The number of proposals received, and the number funded, and the size dispersion and diversity of the audience reached, all attest to an active and powerful program."

"If words are not about real things and do not cause things to happen, what is the good of them? Are they anything more than the barking of village dogs at night?" -- a quote from Solzhenitsyn in the Gulag Archipelago which reminds all of us that our words should be used carefully and with force. It seems to me that the words we have used together in these three days are about real things and that we have caused things to happen. I trust that the Endowment has responded to you, that the words you've heard from us indicate that we have listened; and that, together, we have caused real things to happen.

Joe Duffey opened our meeting by referring to the 1973 meeting of state programs, and he quoted from Charles Frankel's rich and provocative speech given on that occasion. Joan Mondale, yesterday, used Frankel's words to celebrate and revivify his memory. Frankel

was a force and a vehicle for public humanities. He was an important instrumentality for shaping and validating a decision of a brash, young, federal bureaucrat, John Barcroft. I would like to recall what he said at the conclusion of the 1973 meeting, it still is a profound challenge to us. John asked: "Who is the enemy? Who or what is this program about? It is against claptrap; it is against slogans as the new panacea remedy for thought; it is against thirty minute solutions to 300-year-old problems. It is for the complexity of things, for the individual, informed choice, for reason and tolerance. It is not for liberals, it is not for conservatives; it is not for malcontents, it is not for the complacent; it is not anybody's boy. It is for the humanities and for the public. It is not enough for all of us to be able to just say this, however. It has to be true."

APPENDIX

The State Humanities Committees 131

THE STATE HUMANITIES COUNCILS

The Committee for the Humanities in Alabama
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Phone: (205)324-1314
Chairperson: James P. Pate
Executive Director: Jack Geren

Alaska Humanities Forum
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Loussac Sogn Building
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
Phone: (907)272-5341
Chairperson: Tom Richards
Executive Director: Gary Holthaus

Arizona Humanities Council
Suite 304
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Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Phone: (602)257-0335
Chairperson: James P. Walsh
Executive Director: Lorraine Frank

Arkansas Endowment for the Humanities
University Tower Building
12th and University
Little Rock, Arkansas 72204
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Chairperson: Ben N. Saltzman, M.D.
Executive Director: Anthony Dubé

California Council for the Humanities
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San Francisco, California 94108
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Chairperson: Aileen Hernandez
Executive Director: Bruce Sievers

Colorado Humanities Program
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Chairperson: Patricia Schlatter
Executive Director: Kathleen Lemon

Connecticut Humanities Council
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Chairperson: Edgar Beckham
Executive Director: Ronald Wells

Delaware Humanities Council
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Wilmington, Delaware 19806
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Executive Director: Rona Finkelstein

Florida Endowment for the Humanities
LET 360
University of Florida
Tampa, Florida 33620
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Chairperson: Daniel Rutenberg
Executive Director: William Brennan

Committee for the Humanities in Georgia
Georgia Center for Continuing Education
Athens, Georgia 30602
Phone: (404)542-5481
Chairperson: N. Gordon Carver
Acting Director: Anne Mayeaux

Hawaii Committee for the Humanities
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Chairperson: Dorothy Douthit
Executive Director: Annette Lew

The Association for the Humanities in Idaho
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Chairperson: David Rice
Executive Director: David Hansen

Illinois Humanities Council
201 W. Springfield Ave., Suite 205
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Phone: (217)333-7611
Chairperson: Victoria Ranney
Executive Director: Robert Klaus

Indiana Committee for the Humanities
4200 Northwestern Avenue
Indianapolis, Indiana 46208
Phone: (317)925-5316
Chairperson: Nani Ranken
Executive Director: Alan Shusterman

Iowa Board for Public Programs in the Humanities
Oakdale Campus
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319)353-6754
Chairperson: Carol Guardo
Executive Director: Philip Shively

Kansas Committee for the Humanities
112 West 6th St., Suite 509
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Chairperson: Harold Herd
Executive Director: Marion Cott

Kentucky Humanities Council, Inc.
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Lexington, Kentucky 40506
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Chairperson: Pat Stewart
Executive Director: Ralph Janis

Louisiana Committee for the Humanities
4420 S. Robertson
New Orleans, Louisiana 70115
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Chairperson: Seraphia Leyda
Executive Director: David Boileau

Maine Council for the Humanities and Public Policy
PO Box 7202
Portland, Maine 04112
Phone: (207)773-5051
Chairperson: Gloria Duclos
Executive Director: Karen Bowden

The Maryland Committee for the Humanities, Inc.
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Baltimore, Maryland 21201
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Chairperson: Joseph Cox
Executive Director: Judith O'Sullivan

Massachusetts Foundation for Humanities and Public Policy
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Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
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Chairperson: Angela Dorenkamp
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Chairperson: John Eadie
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St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
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Chairperson: Clarke Chambers
Executive Director: Cheryl Dickson

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Jackson, Mississippi 39211
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Chairperson: Estus Smith
Executive Director: Cora Norman

Missouri Committee for the Humanities, Inc.
6920 Millbrook Boulevard
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Chairperson: Robert Kindrick
Executive Director: Robert Walrond

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Missoula, Montana 59807
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Chairperson: Larry Wewel
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Nevada Humanities Committee
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Reno, Nevada 89507
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Chairperson: Patricia Marchese
Executive Director: Elmer Cole

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Concord, New Hampshire 03301
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Chairperson: Mary McGowan
Executive Director: Philip Ginsburg

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Chairperson: Leah Sloshberg
Executive Director: Miriam Murphy

New Mexico Humanities Council
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Chairperson: Frank Ikle
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Chairperson: Helene Kaplan
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Greensboro, North Carolina 27403
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Chairperson: E. Maynard Adams
Executive Director: R. Oakley Winters

North Dakota Committee for the Humanities and Public Issues
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Chairperson: Burton Nygren
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19108
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Chairperson: Carol Brown
Acting Director: Jane Allen

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Tennessee Committee for the Humanities
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